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Abstract.- We study the use of derivatives in the Spanish mutual fund indus-
try. The picture that emerges from our analysis is rather negative. In general,
the use of derivatives does not improve the performance of the funds. In only
one out of eight categories we ﬁnd some (very weak and not robust) evidence
of superior performance. In most of the cases users signiﬁcantly underperform
non users. Furthermore, users do not seem to exhibit superior timing or se-
lectivity skills either, but rather the contrary. This bad performance is only
partially explained by the larger fees funds using derivatives charge. Moreover,
we do not ﬁnd evidence of derivatives being used for hedging purposes. We do
ﬁnd evidence of derivatives being used for speculation. But users in only one
category exhibit skills as speculators. Finally, we ﬁnd evidence of derivatives
being used to manage the funds’ cash inﬂows and outﬂows more e ciently.
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1 Introduction
Spanish mutual funds are heavy users of derivatives. Figure 1 provides some statistics
on derivatives usage. The fraction of funds using derivatives has steadily increased
during the last ten years. By 2005 some 60% of the Spanish mutual funds had some
derivatives position in their portfolio. Even stronger is the increase in the extent of
derivatives usage. The fraction of the total notional of derivatives positions to the
net asset value of all funds increased from 2.7% to 15.8% during the same period.
These ﬁgures sharply contrast with the ﬁgures obtained elsewhere. For instance, in
their study of usage in the US market, Koski and Ponti  (1999) estimate that in
1993 only 21% of US mutual funds were users. In another study, Johnson and Yu
(2004) estimate that the extent of usage in the Canadian market in 1998 ranges from
1.28% to 2.32%. Finally, Pinnuck (2004) reports a maximum extent of usage of 3.34%
in the Australian market during the period 1990 to 1997.1 On the other hand, the
Spanish mutual fund industry is quite large. In Figure 1 we also report the total net
asset value under management by Spanish mutual funds relative to the total market
capitalization of the Spanish market. Assets under management represented 100% of
the Spanish market capitalization in the mid nineties. The ﬁgure has fallen to 60%
by 2005. But this mostly reﬂects the large increase in the size of the Spanish market
during the period. Assets under management amounted to 240 billion Euros at the
beginning of 2005. An impressive ﬁgure. Given the order of magnitude of the Spanish
fund industry and the extensive use of derivatives, it is quite surprising the lack of
research analyzing the impact of derivatives usage on risk and performance, which is
the main goal we pursue in this paper.
Derivatives can be viewed as neutral or potentially performance-enhancing in-
vestment vehicles. Derivatives are neutral when, for instance, managers use them to
1These last two papers use a di erent measure of extent of usage than the one we use in this
paper. Johnson and Yu (2004) measures extent of usage as total market value to the total asset
position of all funds and Pinnuck (2004) as the total option delta position to net asset value of all
funds.3
Figure 1: Derivatives Usage by Spanish Mutual Funds.
This table reports the percentage of users as the number of funds that reported some derivative position in a quarter
divided by the total number of funds registered in the same quarter. Extent of derivative usage is measured as the
total notional positions in derivatives of all funds per quarter divided by the total net asset value of all funds registered
in the same quarter. The size of the mutual fund industry is measured as the total net asset value of all funds in
the quarter divided by the Spanish market capitalization as of the end of the same quarter. The sample covers the
period from March 1995 to March 2005. Fund data is obtained from the Spanish Security and Exchange Commission,
CNMV. The market capitalization data is obtained from the Spanish Central Bank, Banco de Espa˜ na.
synthesize cash positions. If managers were just doing this we should not expect sig-
niﬁcant di erences in the return distributions of users versus non-users of derivatives.
Furthermore, we should not observe signiﬁcant di erences in performance evaluation
measures for users versus non-users of derivatives. But derivatives can also be used as
an instrument for speculation, for risk management or to proﬁt from market imper-
fections, such as transaction costs, or to better manage the fund’s cash inﬂows and
outﬂows. In these cases the return distributions and performance evaluation mea-
sures of users and non users can be quite di erent. In this paper we shed light on
this issue by performing a comprehensive empirical analysis of derivatives usage in
the Spanish mutual fund industry. To achieve this goal we focus on the di erences4
in return distributions and performance of users versus non users of derivatives. We
now turn to brieﬂy relate these two variables to the alternative uses of derivatives.
Derivatives o er high leverage power and are often used as speculative instru-
ments. Indeed this is the view of derivatives that has received the largest amount of
attention in the media, with the extensive coverage of dramatic cases such as Enron,
Daiwa Bank, or Sumitomo Corp (Tschoegl (2003), Johnson and Yu 2004)), which has
contributed to the popular perception of derivatives as risky, even dangerous, instru-
ments that may portray dramatic losses.2 To understand the impact of speculative
usage on return distributions and performance it is worthwhile thinking in users as
market timers. It is well recognized that market timing per se adds volatility and
that skillful timing adds skewness to the portfolio return. Furthermore, timing skills
can be detected using several performance evaluation measures. On the other hand,
some derivatives, such as options, are specially suitable for risk management and
hedging. In particular, derivatives can be used to reduce the tails of the distribution
of returns, that is, to decrease the e ect of extreme market outcomes on portfolio
returns. Hence, we should expect the return distribution of users to exhibit smaller
volatility, shortfall risk and kurtosis than the one of non-users, when derivatives are
used for hedging purposes.
Derivatives can also be used to reduce transaction costs or to manage cashﬂows
e ciently. Regarding costs, it is well know that, for instance, the typical roundtrip
cost on index futures is well below the cost of trading the index constituents in the
spot market. If managers were using derivatives for this purpose we should expect
performance to improve. Regarding the latter issue, there is ample evidence that
funds cash inﬂows and outﬂows are associated to past performance. Ippolito (1992)
shows that funds receive cash inﬂows after periods of good performance, and su er
cash outﬂows after periods of bad performance. If fund managers are reluctant or
unable to invest and divest securities in response to unexpected cash ﬂows, then cash
2For instance, see Koski and Ponti  (1999).5
ﬂows will inﬂuence the risk of the fund. Derivatives can be used to manage the impact
of performance on risk by managing cash ﬂows more e ciently. This is the cash ﬂow
management hypothesis proposed by Koski and Ponti  (1999). Very much related
with this hypothesis is the incentive gaming hypothesis in fund management. Brown
et al. (1996) , Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Koski and Ponti  (1999) study the
relation of past performance on changes in risk. They conclude that as the evaluation
period approaches, managers have an incentive to increase risk after periods of bad
performance and decrease risk after periods of good performance. Derivatives may
be used to either dampen or increase the fund’s risk. Hence derivatives can be used
in a similar fashion for both cash ﬂow management and incentive gaming.
To shed light on these issues we perform an extensive empirical study of derivatives
usage in the Spanish mutual fund industry. Our study covers the period March 1995
to March 2005 and analyzes the universe of funds in the Spanish market.3 It is
indeed the ﬁrst study that uses the whole set of funds in a country and for such an
extended period. Studies for other countries either focus on the cross section of funds
at some particular point in time or just use the time series of a subset of funds. This
is important as our study does not su er from sample selection biases. We classify
the 18 o cial fund types into the following fund categories: Balanced Domestic,
Balanced International, Domestic Equity, European Equity, Foreign Equity, Fixed
Income, Money Market and Global funds. Within each category we separate users
from non users of derivatives. In several parts of the paper we use two deﬁnitions of
usage. We call users to those funds that have used derivatives at least once during
their existence. Since many funds use derivatives very rarely, we also deﬁne heavy
users as those funds that have taken positions in derivatives in more than 75% of
the quarters of their life span and whose average notional positions are in the 75th
percentile.
3The only fund category excluded in our analysis is the case of Guarantee Funds (Fondos Garan-
tizados). We do this for two reasons: ﬁrst, because the fraction of non-users of derivatives in this
category is very small and, second, because of the special structure and objectives of these type of
funds.6
Our study focuses on four main issues. We ﬁrst look at the main characteristics
associated to derivatives usage. We look at two measures of derivatives usage: the
decision to use derivatives and the extent of usage (deﬁned as the fraction of the
notional of derivatives positions to the net asset value of the fund). We ﬁnd that
users tend to be funds that: 1) belong to a large family of funds, 2) have other
funds in the family using derivatives, 3) charge larger management fees, 4) charge no
load fees, 5) are larger and 6) have a lower dividend yield. The ﬁrst two variables
highlight the important role of economies of scale in the decision and extent of usage.
In contrast to the previous literature, in the Spanish case management fees play an
important role in the decision to be user and in the extent of usage. The higher
the management fees the higher the probability of using derivatives and the higher
the extent of derivative use. In addition, we are able to distinguish within the set
of variables that proxy for economies of scale and establish that the key variable is
the existence of other funds in the family using derivatives, rather than the size of
the family per se. The extent of usage is increasing with the number of funds in the
family, the existence of more users in the family, larger management fees and being
younger. These results contrast with those obtained by Johnson and Yu (2004) who
ﬁnd no characteristics associated to the extent of usage.
Second, we perform a comparative study of the risk and performance of users
vs. non users of derivatives. We focus on typical mean-variance and market model
related performance measures and we also test for selectivity and timing skills in
the context of the Treynor-Mazuy (1966) model. The general picture that emerges
from this study is quite negative. In only one category, ﬁxed income funds, users
exhibit superior performance than non-users and this only in the case of returns
before fees. For the rest of categories either there are no signiﬁcant di erences or
users perform worst than non users. The previous result remains true when we look
at fund returns for heavy users of derivatives. The bad picture improves slightly
for some fund categories if we consider before fees returns, but never to the point7
of making derivative users better performers, with the exception of Fixed Income
funds. This results sharply contrasts with those obtained in other markets where, in
general, no signiﬁcant di erences in performance is appreciated. Regarding timing
and selectivity skills users do not seem to exhibit either superior timing or selectivity
skills, but rather the contrary. The only exceptions are the users in the Balance
Domestic and European Equity categories who exhibit timing skills and users in the
Fixed Income category who exhibit selectivity skills.
Since risk has many dimensions beyond the standard deviation of returns and
given that ex ante we expect derivatives usage to a ect higher order moments of
the distribution, we perform a comparative study of the return distributions of users
versus non users of derivatives. This study focuses on the four central moments and
the two 10% tails of the distributions of returns. The analysis of the moments of the
distribution of returns does not support the view that mutual funds use derivatives
for risk management purposes. On the contrary, stronger evidence is found that
derivatives are used either for speculative purposes or to synthesize the typical cash
positions in the category. In general, funds that use derivatives for speculation are
not very successful at this task.
To complete our picture on derivatives usage we perform a ﬁnal exercise testing
the incentive gaming hypothesis versus the cashﬂow management hypothesis. The
evidence on derivatives usage by Spanish mutual funds favors the cashﬂow manage-
ment hypothesis. This result is consistent with the one obtained in Koski and Ponti 
(1999) in their study of the US equity mutual funds. Our study also suggests that
the management of cashﬂows is done by taking positions in market index derivatives.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we brieﬂy review the
literature on the use of derivatives by mutual funds. In section 3 we describe the
institutional setting of the Spanish mutual fund industry and the data used in the
present study. Section 4 is dedicated to the study of the determinants of derivatives
usage. The comparative study on risk and performance is executed in section 5, while8
section 6 is dedicated to the comparative study of the return distributions. In section
7 we test the incentive gaming versus the cashﬂow management hypothesis. The ﬁnal
section 8 is dedicated to some concluding remarks.
2 Related Literature
The existing literature on derivative use by mutual funds is not large and is naturally
separated by countries. Koski and Ponti  (1999) analyze the use of derivatives by the
US equity mutual funds during the year 1993. To determine if a fund uses derivatives
they perform a survey. Johnson and Yu (2004) study the use of derivatives by the
equity, ﬁxed-income and foreign equity mutual funds in Canada in 1998. Finally,
Pinnuck (2004) examines the use of exchange traded options for a sample of Australian
equity mutual funds during the period 1990 to 1997. In this paper we extend the
literature on derivative use in Spain by analyzing a richer data set than the previous
studies. Our data set includes all fund categories, contains actual data on derivatives
positions and covers the period March 1995 to March 2005.
About the incidence of derivative use among the mutual funds there are some
di erences in the ﬁndings. Koski and Ponti  (1999) and Johnson and Yu (2004)
coincide that the use of derivatives is not very extended, they ﬁnd that only about
21% of funds use derivatives. On the other hand, Pinnuck (2004) ﬁnds that 60% of
funds in his sample use derivatives. In the present paper, we ﬁnd that derivative
usage is the Spanish case is more extended. Figure 1 shows that by 2005 some 64% of
all funds in the industry use derivatives. Related to the extent of derivative use, only
Johnson and Yu (2004) and Pinnuck (2004) report some ﬁgures. They use di erent
measures but both conclude that the extent of derivative use is small. Johnson and Yu
(2004) report ranges form 1.28% to 2.32%, while Pinnuck (2004) reports a maximum
of 3.34%.4 In the present paper we measure the extent of usage as the notional
4Johnson and Yu’s measure is total market value of derivatives divided by total asset value, while
Pinnuck’s measure is the total delta of the options positions divided by net asset value.9
amount in derivatives divided by total net asset value. The values of this measure at
the fund level range from zero to 100%, with an average value of 26%.
In relation to the fund characteristics associated to the decision and extent of
derivative usage, Koski and Ponti  (1999) study the fund characteristics associated
with the decision to use derivatives. They ﬁnd that funds with greater trading activ-
ity, as measured by turnover, are more likely to use derivatives, and funds that are
members of families are more likely to use derivatives. Johnson and Yu (2004) ﬁnd
that for ﬁxed income funds and foreign equity funds the decision is related to fund
age, younger funds being more likely to use derivatives. For domestic equity funds
derivative usage is more likely for larger funds and with lower dividend yields and
whether the fund is an Aggressive Growth fund. They do not ﬁnd any relationship
between the extent of derivative use and fund characteristics. Pinnuck (2004) ﬁnds
only weak evidence that larger funds are more likely to use options. In this paper
we analyze both the decision to use and the extent of usage of derivatives. We ﬁnd
that the decision to use derivatives is related to the number of fund in a family, and
that the most important characteristic is the existence of another fund in the family
using derivatives. Larger and older funds increase the probability of using derivatives.
No load funds and funds that have low dividend ratios are more likely to use deriva-
tives. In addition, funds that charge larger management fees are also more likely to
include derivatives among their positions. In contrast to the ﬁndings in Johnson and
Yu (2004) we identify several characteristics associated to the extent of usage. In
particular charging larger management fees and having lower dividend yield ratios is
associated with a greater extent of derivative use.
Related to other risk-performance measures, Koski and Ponti  (1999) report no
systematic di erences among users and nonusers. Only Aggressive Growth funds
have a lower beta than nonusers. They do not compute the Jensen’s alpha, but they
compute the alpha following the Ferson and Shadt (1996) and Shanken (1990) model
of conditional betas. They do not ﬁnd any di erences between users and nonusers of10
derivatives. Johnson and Yu (2004) report a lower and negative alpha and a larger
beta for users of derivatives of Domestic Equity funds, but once they control for
warrants, the e ect is lost and no di erences prevail. Foreign Equity funds show no
di erences in their alpha and beta. They are not able to say anything about the
Fixed Income funds, since their alphas and betas are given by the data source, and
they do not provide these parameters. The results obtained in the present paper
are quite di erent. We study both users and heavy users of derivatives and look at
fund returns before and after fees. We ﬁnd that in four fund categories users perform
signiﬁcantly worst than non users and that in there categories there are no signiﬁcant
di erences. Only users, and specially heavy users, in the ﬁxed income category exhibit
superior performance. These funds exhibit larger sharpe ratios, larger alphas and
larger appraisal ratios.
Regarding market timing, Koski and Ponti  (1999) report no di erences between
users and nonusers of derivatives. Johnson and Yu (2004) do not compute the mar-
ket timing coe cient. Pinnuck (2004) does not mention anything related to market
timing. In the Spanish market the evidence on market timing is mixed. For most of
the fund categories the evidence points at worst timing and selectivity skills of users
than non users. In two categories the evidence favors users and in the rest of the
cases there no signiﬁcant di erences.
Regarding return distributions, Koski and Ponti  (1999) conclude that there are
no systematic di erences among users and nonusers of derivatives. Only Small Com-
pany funds have a smaller and more negative kurtosis and the Aggressive Growth
funds have a larger and positive kurtosis. They do not compute the simple annual
mean return. Johnson and Yu (2004) compute the annual mean return and the stan-
dard deviation but not the other higher moments. They ﬁnd di erences among fund
types. Fixed Income funds have a larger mean return and a larger standard deviation.
Foreign Equity funds have a lower mean return, and Domestic Equity funds have a
lower mean return but a higher standard deviation. Pinnuck (2004) does not clearly11
state if he made this analysis. The evidence for the Spanish market is that derivatives
do a ect the four main central moments of the distribution of returns.
Finally, in relation to the inter-temporal e ect of derivatives on the change in
risk, only Koski and Ponti  (1999) do an analysis of this type. They conclude that
derivative use reduces the change in risk. They interpret this result as being consistent
with their stated hypothesis of derivative use for managing cash ﬂows more e ciently.
In Spain, restricting the sample to all but the ﬁxed income funds, the results are
very similar to those found in Koski and Ponti  (1999). The evidence supports the
hypothesis that users of derivatives reduce their inter-temporal change in risk by
relying on derivatives.
3 Institutional Setting and Database Description
3.1 Institutional Setting of the Spanish Mutual Fund Indus-
try
Mutual funds in Spain are regulated and supervised by the Comisi´ on Nacional del
Mercado de Valores (CNMV), the Spanish equivalent to the US SEC. According to
regulation in place,5 mutual funds are not allowed to have commitments in deriva-
tives above the fund’s net asset value, in addition the premium paid for non-linear
derivatives cannot exceed 10% of the fund’s net asset value, and Money Market funds
are only allowed to use derivatives for hedging purposes. The ﬁrst two restrictions
are not compulsory if the fund pursues a speciﬁc return objective that has been guar-
anteed by a third party. In any case we expect to ﬁnd evidence that Money Market
funds do not use derivatives for speculation, but for hedging purposes. The evidence
on Money Market funds partially supports this expectation. Money Market funds
that use derivatives are indistinguishable from Money Market funds that do not use
5Orden Ministerial, de 6 de julio de 1992; Orden Ministerial, de 10 de junio de 1997; Circular
3/98, de 22 de septiembre.12
derivatives. The CNMV requires mutual funds to report the end of quarter portfolio
of the fund including both on balance and o  balance positions.
3.2 Database Description
The source of the data is the Spanish Security and Exchange Commission (CNMV).
The database consists of the end of quarter open derivative positions for each open
end mutual fund in Spain for the period March 1995 to March 2005. This database
includes the whole population of mutual funds. At the end of March 1995 there were
695 funds, by the end of March 2005 there are a total of 2,623 funds registered. Thus,
the number of funds in this ten year period has increased by a factor of almost 4.
In addition to the open positions in derivatives for each fund, the database in-
cludes information on the daily per share net asset value, the fund’s family,6 the
total net asset value, the management fees,7 and the fees charged for purchases and
redemptions of the fund’s shares and the deposit fee.8 We complement the database
with information on the o cial fund types assigned by the same governmental agency
and the fund’s inception date. The fund categories are as of June, 2004. If a fund
does not have a category assigned it is dropped out of the sample. Finally, we con-
struct some additional variables, namely the number of funds in the family, if there
are more than two funds in the family that report open positions in derivatives, and
the dividend yield. There is also information on the notional and market value of
the derivative positions, which we aggregate per fund and quarter in order to analyze
the extent of derivative use. For most of the positions there is also a brief name or
description of the derivative position. Therefore, the database is an extensive and
comprehensive set of information, which is ideal to analyze the use of derivatives by
the mutual fund industry.
6A fund family is deﬁned as the management company that manages one or more mutual funds.
7The management fees are expressed as a percentage of either total net asset value or return, or
a combination of both.
8In Spain funds pay a deposit fee which is based on the total assets under management and is
represented as an annual percentage.13
There are 18 o cial fund types which we aggregate into 9 fund categories for
ease of analysis and exposition and to relate our study to those performed for other
countries. In Appendix A we describe these o cial categories. The grouping of the
o cial fund types into categories is based on the deﬁnitions of their their percent-
ages invested in di erent asset classes. The o cial fund types are: FIAMM, Money
Market funds; RFCP, Short Term Fixed Income funds; RFLP, Long Term Fixed In-
come funds; RFI, International Fixed Income funds; RFM, Balanced Fixed Income
funds; RVM, Balanced Equity funds; RFMI, Balanced International Fixed Income
funds; RVMI, Balanced International Equity funds; RVN, Domestic Equity funds;
RVE, European Equity funds; RVIE, RVIJ, RVIU, RVIM, RVIO, for International
Equity funds specializing in the geographical regions Europe, Japan, USA, Emerg-
ing Markets, and Other Markets respectively; GRV, GRF, Equity and Fixed Income
Guaranteed funds; and FGL, Global funds.9 The created new fund categories are Bal-
anced Domestic, Balanced International, Domestic Equity, European Equity, Foreign
Equity, Guaranteed, Fixed Income, Money Market, and Specialty.
The database consists of a total of 41 quarters, with a total of 3,383 funds for the
whole time period. We drop out all those funds for which we could not assign an
o cial type.10 In addition, we only use funds with at least three years of observations
and that are not Guarantee funds. The ﬁnal sample size consists of 1,707 funds for
the whole time period. Table 1 presents the aggregation of the o cial fund types into
the new categories, including information on the sample size of each category.
Based on the per share net asset value, the management fees, and the deposit fees
the before- and after-fees-monthly returns are computed for each fund. In the study
we use two deﬁnitions of funds using derivatives: users and heavy users. Users are
funds that have taken positions in derivatives at least once during their existence.
Heavy users as funds that have taken positions in derivatives in more than 75% of
the quarters of their life span and whose average notional positions are in the 75th
9The o cial description of each fund type is in the table 19
10In Appendix A we discuss the treatment of some conﬂictive observations found in the dataset.14
Table 1: Aggregation of Funds into Categories.


























This table reports the number of funds per o cial fund types and the aggregation into mutual fund categories for the analysis in this
paper. The criteria used for the aggregation is the deﬁnition of each fund type, putting funds with similar deﬁnition into the same
category (see appendix A). The sample covers the period from March 1995 to March 2005, and consists of those funds with at least
three years of observations.Fund data is obtained from the Spanish Security and Exchange Commission, CNMV.
percentile of the whole population.
In the paper we use other non fund related data. In particular in the regression
analysis we use index data to proxy for the relevant benchmark. The source of these
indexes is Datastream, and the indexes used are the FTSE World Index for the
global funds, the IGBM for the domestic equity funds and the balanced funds, FTSE
Euroblock Index for the European funds, the Nikkei 300 for the funds investing in
Japan, the MSCI Emerging Index for Emerging funds, and the S&P500 for the US
funds.15
3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Based on the derivative positions of each fund we construct Table 2 that provides
the average numbers of some of the time series presented in Figure 1 for each fund
category.
It is clear that derivative use is quite extended across fund categories. The average
proportion of derivative users through time is about 40% within each fund category
(see column 1 in table 2), with the exception of Money Market funds for which only
an average of 19% is reported. Moreover, the amount of derivative positions is quite
large. The average proportion of notional value to net asset value through categories
is about 13%. Money Market funds are the less aggressive funds with only a 2%
average position in derivatives to total net asset value, and Domestic Equity funds
the most aggressive funds with an average proportion in derivatives of almost 26% of
total net asset value (see column 2 in table 2). It is also important to notice that there
is an important proportion of heavy derivative users within each fund category. The
average proportion of these type of funds is about 13% across fund categories. Their
aggressiveness in derivative positioning is quite clear. On average they have about
40% of net asset value invested in derivative positions as measured by their notional
value. European equity funds having the most aggressive heavy users of derivatives
with a 62% average position in derivatives, followed by Global funds with a 58%, and
Domestic Equity funds with a 51%. Finally the least aggressive fund category are the
Money Market funds with a 3.6% average position in derivatives.
The CNMV requires the funds to separate their end of quarter positions into two
di erent ﬁles, one for the derivative positions and the other for non derivative po-
sitions. Using the name or brief description available for the derivatives we classify
each derivative into derivative types.11 The total number of derivatives instruments
11In order to do the classiﬁcation we run a program that distinguishes some key words found in
the derivative descriptions for some derivative types. The program classiﬁes about a 98% of the
derivatives, the rest is classiﬁed by hand.16
Table 2: Derivatives Usage by Type of Fund.
Users of Derivatives Heavy Users of Derivatives
Category Percentage Extent Percentage Extent
Balanced Domestic 46.6% 11.0% 13.6% 28.0%
Balanced International 44.1% 16.9% 13.6% 29.4%
Domestic Equity 65.4% 25.7% 15.1% 50.7%
Foreign Equity 38.7% 10.2% 14.8% 40.2%
Fixed Income 44.4% 10.6% 14.8% 30.5%
Money Market 18.5% 2.0% 9.1% 3.6%
Global 45.2% 14.9% 11.6% 57.8%
European Equity 50.2% 11.5% 14.4% 61.7%
This table collects for each fund category the average over the sample period of he percentage of derivative users and the extent of
derivative use, as measured by the total notional positions in derivatives per quarter divided by the total net asset value. The extent
for heavy users is the total notional position in derivatives of heavy users divided by the total net asset value of the heavy users of
derivative. The sample covers the period from March 1995 to March 2005. Fund data is obtained from the Spanish Security and
Exchange Commission, CNMV. The market capitalization data is obtained from the Spanish Central Bank, Banco de Espa˜ na.
for the sample period form March 1995 to March 2005 is 127,603.12 Table 3 shows the
preferences for the di erent type of derivatives in the Spanish mutual fund industry
for the 1995-2005 period. We can observe that 32.8% of the positions correspond to
option-type (non-linear) derivatives, while 48.4% are non-option type (linear) deriva-
tives. We could not recognize 7% of the positions as any type of derivative and 10%
were recognized as non derivative positions. According to the classiﬁcation of the
registered derivatives a greater proportion of derivatives are linear, while a smaller
proportion of derivatives are non-linear. Based on the linear derivatives there is a
preference for Futures, and based on the non-linear derivatives there is a preference
for Calls and Floors. Warrants do not account for a great amount of derivative
use. Among the non-recognized instruments most of them correspond to bond and
currency related assets.
4 Determinants and Extent of Derivative Use
In this section we analyze the fund characteristics that are related to both the deci-
sion to use derivatives and the extent of usage. In the case of the decision to use
derivatives we run a weighted least squares logit regression where the dependent vari-
12The same derivative instrument may be a position for one or more funds and for several months,
but is counted as a single derivative instrument in this analysis.17
Table 3: Use of Derivatives by Instrument Type.
Instruments N % of Sub totals % of total
Put 8,377 20% 7%
Call 14,751 35% 12%
Floor 13,745 33% 11%
Cap 1,219 3% 1%
Warrant 975 2% 1%
Unknown Non Linear 2,814 7% 2%
41,881
Forward 11,093 18% 9%
Future 42,405 69% 33%
Swap 6,696 11% 5%
Strips 123 0% 0%
Unknown Linear 1,416 2% 1%
61,733
Unknown Derivative 9,396 100% 7%
Bond 6,754 54% 5%
Currency 4,854 39% 4%
Unknown Non Derivative 947 8% 1%
12,555
Unknown Instrument 2,034 100% 2%
Total 127,599
The table reports the distribution of the di erent derivative instruments used in the Spanish mutual fund industry. The classiﬁcation
is according to key words found in the description of the registered derivative instruments. A remaining small number of registered
derivatives could not be classiﬁed. The sample covers the period March 1995 to March 2005. Fund data is obtained from the Spanish
Security and Exchange Commission, CNMV.
able is a variable that takes the value one if the fund is a user and zero otherwise.13
In the case of the extent of usage we run a weighted least squares regression where
the dependent variable is the ratio of the average notional in derivatives position to
the average fund net asset value.
In both regressions, the explanatory variables are the number of funds in the
family, a dummy indicating if in the family there are other funds using derivatives,
the size, the age, the management fees, a dummy indicating if the fund charges front-
or back-end load fees, a measure for the dividend yield, and dummies that control for
fund category.
Economies of scale may play an important role in the decision and extent of
13A logit model is a more adequate model if the frequency of ones is very high, which is the case
for derivative users in the sample (Greene).18
derivatives usage. High initial costs in equipment and regulatory requirements may
prevent individual funds to use derivatives. Economies of scale considerations suggest
that we should expect a greater use of derivatives when the fund belongs to a large
family of funds, when there are more funds in the same family using derivatives and
when the fund is large. Larger funds may also be more willing to use derivatives
in order to manage their large positions more e ciently. The age of the fund may
also play a role on the choice to use derivatives. On the one hand if young funds are
associated with young managers, it could be that young managers are more willing
to use sophisticated ﬁnancial instruments. On the other hand, older funds may be
managed by well experienced professionals who in turn are allowed to use derivatives.
Skillful managers may have a preference for derivatives. Since these managers are
relatively better paid, larger fees are expected to be associated to larger derivatives
usage. Load fees may be used to control for investor redemptions and deposits. The
larger the load the smaller the cash inﬂows and outﬂows. If derivatives are used to
manage cash ﬂows then funds that charge no loads are more likely to use derivatives.
Finally, the dividend yield may proxy the fund’s investment style, associating higher
dividend yield with value funds. Growth oriented funds may be more likely to use
derivatives in order to capture the growth of stocks more e ciently.
4.1 Determinants of the decision to use derivatives
To analyze the decision to use derivatives we consider the following logit model:
deri =   +  1numfundsi +  2moreusersi +  3lognavi +  4assetfeei (1)
+ 5inceptioni +  6noloadi +  7divyieldi +
 
j
 jdummyj,i +  i
where deri is a zero-one variable indicating derivative use by fund i, numfundsi is
the number of funds in the family, moreusersi is the dummy indicating if there is
another fund in the family using derivatives, lognavi is the log of the net asset value,19
assetfeei is the management fee, inceptioni is the year of inception, noloadi is the
dummy indicating if the fund charges no loads, divyieldi is a measure for the dividend
yield, and the rest of dummies control for fund category.
Table 4: Determinants of the Decision and Extent of Derivatives Usage.
Decision Extent
Number of funds in family 0.0006 0.001
(0)*** (0.000)***
More users of derivatives in family 0.1399 0.096
(0.024)*** (0.057)*
Log of net asset value 0.0155 0.001
(0.005)*** (0.007)
Management fee 0.0624 0.093
(0.025)** (0.039)**
Inception year -0.0010 0.005
(0.002) (0.003)**
No load 0.0336 -0.013
(0.012)*** (0.017)




Degrees of freedom 14
Log Likelihood -299.51
Pseudo r2 0.27 0.23
This table reports a weighted logit for the Determinants regression and a weighted least squares for the Extent regression. The weights
are one divided by the square root of the number of observations used to compute the averages of the fund characteristics. The dependent
variable, in the Determinants regression, is a zero-one variable indicating derivative use. In the Extent regression the dependent variable
is the open Notional position in derivatives to total net asset value. Marginal e ects of fund characteristics evaluated at average values
are the coe cients in the Determinants regression and Extent of Derivative Use. The fund categories are the control variables. The
sample covers the period from March 1995 to March 2005, and consists of those funds with at least three years of observations.Fund
data is obtained from the Spanish Security and Exchange Commission, CNMV. Standard errors are in parentheses. * signiﬁcant at
10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
The ﬁrst column in Table 4 reports the results obtained in the logit model (1).
First notice that we ﬁnd that the probability of using derivatives increases with the
number of funds in the family, the existence of other users in the family and with
the size of the fund. These three ﬁrst results highlight the key role of economies of
scales in the decision to use derivatives. The signiﬁcance of size also supports the
idea that larger funds are more willing to use derivatives to manage their positions.
Larger management fees also have a positive e ect on the probability of using deriva-
tives, probably indicating that more skillful managers are better paid and are more20
likely to use derivatives. Higher skilled managers are more likely to use derivatives.
Charging no loads increases by 2.5% the probability of using derivatives indicating
the possibility of derivatives being used for cash ﬂow management purposes. This
hypothesis is corroborated in section 7 using a di erent methodology. The results
also show that low dividend yields are related to derivative use, indicating the use
of derivatives by growth oriented funds. The only variable that does not a ect the
decision to use derivatives is the fund’s age.
To sum up, at the fund level, having more funds in the family, having other funds
in the family using derivatives, having larger assets, charging larger fees on total
assets, charging no loads and having a lower dividend yield increases the probability
of using derivatives.
4.2 Extent of derivatives usage
In this case we run a weighted least squares regression of equation (1) deﬁning deri as
the extent of usage rather than the binary variable for the decision to use derivatives.
This variable is the average position in derivatives divided by the average fund net
asset value for the 1995-2005 period. The results obtained in the estimation are
reported in the second column of Table 4. Again, economies of scale play a signiﬁcant
role. The only variable related to economies of scales that loses signiﬁcance is the
fund’s size. Management fees again are positively related to usage. Unlike in the case
of the decision to use derivatives, the fund’s age is signiﬁcant. That is, younger funds
are more aggressive in their position taking in derivatives.
Two main conclusions can be drawn from the exercise in this section. First, the
main characteristics associated to the decision to use derivatives and the extent of
its use are those related to economies of scale and fees. Users are more likely to be
funds that belong to a large family of funds in which other funds also use derivatives.
Furthermore, users are more likely to be expensive funds. This last result motivates
our decision to consider fund returns both before and after fees in the empirical study21
that follows. The other main conclusion is that there is evidence of users being funds
that do not penalize cash inﬂows and outﬂows. This already hints at users as funds
that may be using derivatives to manage these cashﬂows. In section ?? we retake this
issue and provide extra evidence in support of this conjecture.
5 Derivatives Usage and Performance
5.1 Fund Risk and Performance in the Context of the Market
Model
In this section we study the performance of users versus non users of derivatives, in
each of the fund categories, using performance measures that arise in the basic mean
variance/CAPM framework. In particular we compare how well the group of users
versus non-users perform in term of Sharpe ratios, Jensen’s alphas, appraisal ratios,
and the Treynor index. The Sharpe ratio is the fund’s excess return above the risk free
rate divided by the standard deviation. It is the appropriate performance measure
from the point of view of no well diversiﬁed investors or investors who are heavily
invested in the fund. Positive Sharpe ratios and above the Sharpe ratio of the market
portfolio constitute evidence of superior performance. The Jensen’s alpha corresponds
to the alpha of the market model. It is the measure of performance of interest for
well diversiﬁed investors. A positive alpha is evidence of superior performance. The
appraisal ratio is deﬁned as the Jensen’s alpha divided by the root mean squared error
of the market model. It is a measure of interest for well diversiﬁed investors. The
larger the appraisal ratio, the better the performance. Finally, the Treynor index is
similar to the Sharpe ratio, only that the adjustment is made according to the fund’s
exposure to the market (beta) rather than the total risk. It indicates if the fund
outperforms the risk free rate and if the performance is achieved with lower market22
exposure14.
The market model is given by:
ri,t   rf,t =  i +  i   (rm,t   rf,t) +  i,t (2)
where ri,t is the fund’s return, rf,t is the risk free rate, and rm,t is the market’s return.
The appropriate market portfolio is selected according to the o cial fund type. For
the Balanced Domestic and Domestic Equity funds the Spanish market index, IGBM,
is used. For the European Equity and Foreign Equity funds the corresponding market
index is selected, ranging form the FTSE Euro Block Index, FTSE World index, the
Medium Term and Long Term Index,15 the Nikkei 300, the MSCI Emerging Index,
and the S&P500. For the Money Market funds and Short Term Fixed Income Funds
the return on the market are the Spanish treasury bills and the risk-free rate is the one
week repo rate. For all other funds the risk-free rate is the Spanish one month treasury
bill16. The sources of the information are Datastream and the Spanish Central bank.
We ﬁrst estimate the market model for the whole universe of funds. Then we
separate users from non users and group each one of them in their corresponding
category. We test for di erences in the means of the coe cients for users versus non
users using the t-statistic. To test for di erences in the median we use the Wilcoxon
test. Table 5 reports the results. The table also includes information of the betas
and the idiosyncratic risk estimated using the market model. First, in sharp contrast
to the results obtained in Koski and Ponti  (1999) for the US market, in the Spanish
case there are only three fund categories for which fund users are not distinguished
from non users: Balance Domestic, Foreign Equity and Money Market. Furthermore,
in the case of Money Market funds the result is expected since by regulation Money
14For a deeper discussion on these performance measures and results obtained in the Spanish
market, for instance see Marin and Rubio (2001).
15This Medium and Long Term Index is constructed by the Spanish Central Bank, Banco de
Espa˜ na.
16The treasury bills are known as ”Letras del Tesoro” in Spanish.23
Market funds are only allowed to use derivatives to reduce risk. More striking even is
that we only ﬁnd one category where there is some (very weak) evidence of a better
performance by users: Fixed income. In particular, users exhibit a larger appraisal
ratio, but also a smaller Sharpe ratio than non users. In the remaining four categories
users perform worst than non-users, in the sense of exhibiting bad news in at least
one performance evaluation measure.
Table 5: Risk and Performance of Users in a Market Model
Context.
Category measure non-users users ttest Wilcoxon
N mean N mean t-stat z-stat
Balanced Domestic Beta 35 0.3792 282 0.3197 1.65 1.6
Idiosyncratic risk 35 0.0110 282 0.0104 0.53 0.78
Jensen’s alpha 35 -0.0018 282 -0.0018 0.03 -0.08
Appraisal Ratio 35 -0.1715 282 -0.1855 0.47 -0.15
Sharpe Ratio 35 -0.0458 282 -0.0191 -1.33 -1.29
Treynor Index 35 -0.0021 282 -0.0037 0.33 -0.93
Balanced International Beta 20 0.4106 93 0.3127 1.9* 2.17**
Idiosyncratic risk 20 0.0099 93 0.0114 -0.82 -0.8
Jensen’s alpha 20 0.0003 93 -0.0007 2.64*** 2.8***
Appraisal Ratio 20 0.0193 93 -0.0905 3.08*** 2.68***
Sharpe Ratio 20 -0.0926 93 -0.0842 -0.3 -0.31
Treynor Index 20 -0.0051 93 -0.0145 0.68 0.5
Domestic Equity Beta 6 0.8155 78 0.8870 -0.78 -1.77*
Idiosyncratic risk 6 0.0117 78 0.0140 -0.83 -1.09
Jensen’s alpha 6 0.0014 78 -0.0010 1.93* 2.29**
Appraisal Ratio 6 0.1347 78 -0.0908 2.55** 2.33**
Sharpe Ratio 6 0.1186 78 0.0820 1.21 0.61
Treynor Index 6 0.0067 78 0.0055 0.57 0.45
European Equity Beta 30 0.8620 127 0.9504 -1.82* -2.33**
Idiosyncratic risk 30 0.0251 127 0.0208 2.56** 2.76***
Jensen’s alpha 30 0.0023 127 -0.0003 3.64*** 2.68***
Appraisal Ratio 30 0.0679 127 -0.0349 3.06*** 2.41**
Sharpe Ratio 30 0.0122 127 -0.0267 1.88* 0.85
Treynor Index 30 0.0020 127 -0.0006 1.38 0.81
Fixed Income Beta 34 1.0967 348 0.6753 2.61*** 2.19**
Idiosyncratic risk 34 0.0031 348 0.0056 -2.35** -4.09***
Jensen’s alpha 34 -0.0009 348 -0.0005 -1.45 -1.31
Appraisal Ratio 34 -0.5831 348 -0.1645 -4.17*** -3.6***
Sharpe Ratio 34 1.2114 348 0.5786 4.4*** 3.86***
Treynor Index 34 0.0023 348 0.0005 0.52 -0.15
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Category measure non-users users ttest Wilcoxon
N mean N mean t-stat z-stat
Foreign Equity Beta 49 0.8943 211 0.8848 0.22 0.45
Idiosyncratic risk 49 0.0236 211 0.0278 -2.1** -1.75*
Jensen’s alpha 49 -0.0002 211 -0.0011 1.25 1.18
Appraisal Ratio 49 -0.0315 211 -0.0504 0.72 0.85
Sharpe Ratio 49 -0.0698 211 -0.0783 0.53 0.3
Treynor Index 49 -0.0041 211 -0.0044 0.26 0.45
Money Market Beta 51 0.9599 159 0.8932 0.88 -0.32
Idiosyncratic risk 51 0.0011 159 0.0009 0.43 -1.4
Jensen’s alpha 51 -0.0006 159 -0.0003 -0.71 -0.27
Appraisal Ratio 51 -1.1404 159 -0.9858 -1.21 -0.59
Sharpe Ratio 51 1.6417 159 1.5402 1.33 1.45
Treynor Index 51 0.0017 159 0.0026 -1.52 0.1
Global Beta 17 0.3655 165 0.3357 0.4 0.14
Idiosyncratic risk 17 0.0122 165 0.0172 -1.46 -1.57
Jensen’s alpha 17 0.0004 165 -0.0010 1.61 2.38**
Appraisal Ratio 17 -0.0405 165 -0.0596 0.47 1.72*
Sharpe Ratio 17 -0.1060 165 -0.0680 -1.06 -0.24
Treynor Index 17 -0.0333 165 0.0030 -0.56 -0.22
This table presents the results for di erent risk and performance measures per fund category and group: users and nonusers of derivatives.
A t-test and a Wilcoxon test are performed on the mean and median group values, respectively.The measures are the appraisal ratio,
the beta of a market model, the Jensen’s alpha form a market model, the idiosyncratic risk measured by the root mean squared error
of the market model, the Sharpe ratio, and the Treynor index. Computations are based on monthly returns. The sample covers the
period from March 1995 to March 2005 and funds with more than three years of monthly observations. Fund data is obtained from the
Spanish Security and Exchange Commission, CNMV. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
It is possible that the very negative picture that arises from Table 5 is due to our
deﬁnition of users. In particular, we may be including as users funds that have used
derivatives very rarely and with bad luck in the past. For this reason we repeat the
previous exercise but using the deﬁnition of heavy users. In this case we are looking
at the performance of funds that not only use derivatives frequently but also take
positions whose notional is relatively large.
In Table 6 we report the results for heavy users. In general the results do not im-
prove signiﬁcantly. But there is some new evidence which is worthwhile addressing.
First, Fixed Income remains as the only category in which there is some evidence of
outperformance. The evidence is still very weak as only the appraisal ratio remains
signiﬁcantly larger. The second observation is that we now ﬁnd some evidence of
improved and worsening in performance in some of the other categories. In particular25
the performance of users in the Foreign Equity worsens (before there were no dif-
ferences and now they exhibit worst performance) and the performance in European
Equity funds improve (moving from underperformance to no signiﬁcant di erences).
In the rest of categories the results are as negative or worst than before.
Table 6: Risk and Performance of Heavy Users in a Market
Model Context.
Category measure non-users heavy users ttest Wilcoxon
N mean N mean t-stat z-stat
Balanced Domestic Beta 35 0.3792 50 0.3429 0.8 0.74
Idiosyncratic Risk 35 0.0110 50 0.0105 0.39 0.6
Jensen’s alpha 35 -0.0018 50 -0.0018 0.07 0.14
Appraisal Ratio 35 -0.1715 50 -0.1915 0.57 -0.03
Sharpe Ratio 35 -0.0458 50 -0.0227 -0.84 -0.91
Treynor Index 35 -0.0021 50 -0.0015 -0.3 -0.75
Balanced International Beta 20 0.4106 17 0.3141 1.67 1.77*
Idiosyncratic Risk 20 0.0099 17 0.0124 -0.88 -0.76
Jensen’s alpha 20 0.0003 17 -0.0009 2.8*** 2.62***
Appraisal Ratio 20 0.0193 17 -0.0976 2.71** 2.29**
Sharpe Ratio 20 -0.0926 17 -0.0868 -0.2 0.03
Treynor Index 20 -0.0051 17 -0.0051 0.04 0.49
Domestic Equity Beta 6 0.8155 15 1.0250 -5.57*** -3.43***
Idiosyncratic Risk 6 0.0117 15 0.0109 0.48 0.47
Jensen’s alpha 6 0.0014 15 -0.0013 2.57** 1.95*
Appraisal Ratio 6 0.1347 15 -0.1253 2.67** 2.02**
Sharpe Ratio 6 0.1186 15 0.0602 1.67 1.09
Treynor Index 6 0.0067 15 0.0037 1.53 1.01
European Equity Beta 30 0.8620 28 1.0137 -2.69*** -3.1***
Idiosyncratic Risk 30 0.0251 28 0.0202 2.34** 2.35**
Jensen’s alpha 30 0.0023 28 0.0009 1.21 0.87
Appraisal Ratio 30 0.0679 28 0.0326 0.73 0.36
Sharpe Ratio 30 0.0122 28 -0.0380 1.56 1.03
Treynor Index 30 0.0020 28 -0.0020 1.66 1.04
Fixed Income Beta 34 1.0967 71 0.6421 1.91* 2.16**
Idiosyncratic Risk 34 0.0031 71 0.0076 -3.49*** -5.07***
Jensen’s alpha 34 -0.0009 71 -0.0004 -1.1 -1.38
Appraisal Ratio 34 -0.5831 71 -0.1059 -3.76*** -3.78***
Sharpe Ratio 34 1.2114 71 0.3105 6.74*** 4.43***
Treynor Index 34 0.0023 71 0.0032 -0.31 1.19
Foreign Equity Beta 49 0.8943 49 0.8991 -0.11 0.47
Idiosyncratic Risk 49 0.0236 49 0.0289 -1.97* -1.35
Jensen’s alpha 49 -0.0002 49 -0.0009 0.83 0.41
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Category measure non-users heavy users ttest Wilcoxon
N mean N mean t-stat z-stat
Appraisal Ratio 49 -0.0315 49 -0.0370 0.15 -0.07
Sharpe Ratio 49 -0.0698 49 -0.1035 1.72* 1.74*
Treynor Index 49 -0.0041 49 -0.0067 2.11** 2.03**
Money Market Beta 51 0.9599 40 0.9568 0.06 -1.16
Idiosyncratic Risk 51 0.0011 40 0.0008 0.89 -2.29**
Jensen’s alpha 51 -0.0006 40 -0.0006 0.08 -0.22
Appraisal Ratio 51 -1.1404 40 -0.8582 -1.54 -1.03
Sharpe Ratio 51 1.6417 40 1.5350 1.02 1.03
Treynor Index 51 0.0017 40 0.0027 -0.91 -1.18
Global Beta 17 0.3655 27 0.3395 0.25 -0.11
Idiosyncratic Risk 17 0.0122 27 0.0188 -1.2 -1.1
Jensen’s alpha 17 0.0004 27 -0.0020 1.56 2.16**
Appraisal Ratio 17 -0.0405 27 -0.0700 0.51 1.77*
Sharpe Ratio 17 -0.1060 27 -0.0831 -0.42 0.3
Treynor Index 17 -0.0333 27 -0.0516 0.48 0.4
The table presents the results for di erent risk and performance measures per fund category and group: heavy users and non users of
derivatives. Funds are deﬁned as heavy users if their frequency of derivative use is larger than the 75 percentile and their average ratio
of notional value in derivatives to net asset value is larger than the 75 percentile. A t-test and a Wilcoxon test are performed on the
mean and median group values, respectively.The measures are the appraisal ratio, the beta of a market model, the Jensen’s alpha form
a market model, the idiosyncratic risk measured by the root mean squared error of the market model, the Sharpe ratio, and the Treynor
index. Computations are based on monthly returns and the management fee and the deposit fees are added back. The sample covers
the period from March 1995 to March 2005 and funds with more than three years of monthly observations. Fund data is obtained from
the Spanish Security and Exchange Commission, CNMV. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
In Section 4 we provided evidence of fund users being relatively expensive funds.
It may be the case that the poor performance of users identiﬁed in the previous two
exercises is due to the large expenses these funds must satisfy. To verify this we
repeat our performance analysis but using the fund returns before fees rather than
after fees as we did before. Results are reported in Tables 7 and 8. In general the
results improve a little bit in the case of users but not in the case of heavy users. In
particular, we ﬁnd improvements in two categories: Money Market funds (in terms
of the appraisal ratio) and Foreign Equity (in terms of Jensen’s alpha). On the other
hand, the only category exhibiting some signs of superior performance after fees,
Fixed Income, stops exhibiting superior performance in terms of the appraisal ratio,
but now exhibits superior performance in terms of Jensen’s alpha. However, there are
no further improvements when we look at heavy users. In this case the three previ-
ous categories (Fixed Income, Money Market and Foreign Equity) remain exhibiting27
superior performance, but the rest of categories exhibit now worst performance17.
Table 7: Risk and Performance Before Fees of Users in a
Market Model Context.
Category measure non-users users ttest Wilcoxon
N mean N mean t-stat z-stat
Balanced Domestic Beta 35 0.3785 282 0.3198 1.62 1.57
Idiosyncratic Risk 35 -0.0006 282 -0.0004 -0.76 -0.8
Jensen’s alpha 35 0.0110 282 0.0104 0.52 0.75
Appraisal Ratio 35 -0.0495 282 -0.0008 -1.67* -1.56***
Sharpe Ratio 35 0.0136 282 0.0717 -3.11*** -2.32
Treynor Index 35 0.0024 282 0.0067 -1.61 -2.29
Balanced International Beta 20 0.4108 93 0.3127 1.9* 2.18**
Idiosyncratic Risk 20 0.0017 93 0.0006 2.98*** 2.93***
Jensen’s alpha 20 0.0099 93 0.0114 -0.83 -0.85
Appraisal Ratio 20 0.1987 93 0.0624 4.19*** 3.43*
Sharpe Ratio 20 -0.0218 93 0.0104 -1.28 -1.11
Treynor Index 20 -0.0011 93 -0.0048 0.31 -0.8
Domestic Equity Beta 6 0.8148 78 0.8871 -0.78 -1.77*
Idiosyncratic Risk 6 0.0028 78 0.0006 1.83* 1.91*
Jensen’s alpha 6 0.0117 78 0.0140 -0.83 -1.11
Appraisal Ratio 6 0.2668 78 0.0413 2.79*** 2.36***
Sharpe Ratio 6 0.1492 78 0.1137 1.14 0.57**
Treynor Index 6 0.0085 78 0.0076 0.31 0.28
European Equity Beta 30 0.8620 127 0.9506 -1.83* -2.34**
Idiosyncratic Risk 30 0.0038 127 0.0013 3.51*** 2.53**
Jensen’s alpha 30 0.0251 127 0.0208 2.56** 2.76***
Appraisal Ratio 30 0.1341 127 0.0532 2.62*** 1.92***
Sharpe Ratio 30 0.0413 127 0.0054 1.71* 0.7**
Treynor Index 30 0.0038 127 0.0024 0.39 0.71
Fixed Income Beta 34 -0.4950 348 -0.2567 -0.57 -1.15
Idiosyncratic Risk 34 -0.0002 348 0.0007 -3.19*** -4.89***
Jensen’s alpha 34 0.0031 348 0.0056 -2.36** -4.1***
Appraisal Ratio 34 0.2882 348 0.2602 0.32 0.19
Sharpe Ratio 34 1.7206 348 0.8769 5.01*** 3.93**
Treynor Index 34 0.0029 348 0.0052 -0.47 -2.06
Foreign Equity Beta 49 0.8944 211 0.8849 0.22 0.45
Idiosyncratic Risk 49 0.0014 211 0.0005 1.26 1.15
Jensen’s alpha 49 0.0236 211 0.0278 -2.1** -1.74*
Appraisal Ratio 49 0.0456 211 0.0189 1.09 1.23
Continued on next page
17The exception is the Balance Domestic category in which there are no signiﬁcant di erences in
performance in any of the four exercises we execute.28
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Category measure non-users users ttest Wilcoxon
N mean N mean t-stat z-stat
Sharpe Ratio 49 -0.0414 211 -0.0475 0.37 0.33
Treynor Index 49 -0.0023 211 -0.0029 0.48 0.58
Money Market Beta 51 -0.0320 159 0.0089 -0.26 1.37
Idiosyncratic Risk 51 0.0002 159 0.0002 -0.09 -3.23***
Jensen’s alpha 51 0.0011 159 0.0009 0.4 -1.19
Appraisal Ratio 51 0.5036 159 0.5305 -0.33 -1.26*
Sharpe Ratio 51 2.2178 159 2.1264 0.97 0.88
Treynor Index 51 -0.0090 159 0.0034 -1.76* -0.53
Global Beta 17 0.3656 165 0.3359 0.4 0.14
Idiosyncratic Risk 17 0.0016 165 0.0002 1.74* 2.33**
Jensen’s alpha 17 0.0122 165 0.0172 -1.46 -1.56
Appraisal Ratio 17 0.1578 165 0.0524 2.64*** 2.53***
Sharpe Ratio 17 0.0509 165 0.0163 0.92 0.23***
Treynor Index 17 -0.0002 165 0.0719 -0.43 -0.72
The table presents the results for di erent risk and performance measures per fund category and group: users and nonusers of derivatives.
A t-test and a Wilcoxon test are performed on the mean and median group values, respectively.The measures are the appraisal ratio,
the beta of a market model, the Jensen’s alpha form a market model, the idiosyncratic risk measured by the root mean squared error of
the market model, the Sharpe ratio, and the Treynor index. Computations are based on monthly returns and the management fee and
the deposit fees are added back. The sample covers the period from March 1995 to March 2005 and funds with more than three years
of monthly observations. Fund data is obtained from the Spanish Security and Exchange Commission, CNMV. * signiﬁcant at 10%; **
signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
Two big conclusions can be drawn from these last two exercises. First, it turns
out that charging large expenses is one of the variables behind the poor performance
of mutual funds using derivatives. This variable, however, only provides a partial
explanation as it does not account for the underperformance in all categories. Second,
contrary to what we expected, heavy usage is not associated to improvements in
performance. Heave usage is a (probably noisy) proxy for expertise in derivative
usage. It is rather paradoxical that more experienced derivative traders do not exhibit
superior performance.
Table 8: Risk and Performance Before Fees of Heavy Users
in a Market Model Context.
Category measure non-users heavy users ttest Wilcoxon
N mean N mean t-stat z-stat
Balanced Domestic Beta 35 0.3785 282 0.3198 1.62 1.57
Idiosyncratic Risk 35 -0.0006 282 -0.0004 -0.76 -0.8
Jensen’s alpha 35 0.0110 282 0.0104 0.52 0.75
Appraisal Ratio 35 -0.0495 282 -0.0008 -1.67* -1.56***
Sharpe Ratio 35 0.0136 282 0.0717 -3.11*** -2.32
Treynor Index 35 0.0024 282 0.0067 -1.61 -2.29
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Category measure non-users heavy users ttest Wilcoxon
N mean N mean t-stat z-stat
Balanced International Beta 20 0.4108 93 0.3127 1.9* 2.18**
Idiosyncratic Risk 20 0.0017 93 0.0006 2.98*** 2.93***
Jensen’s alpha 20 0.0099 93 0.0114 -0.83 -0.85
Appraisal Ratio 20 0.1987 93 0.0624 4.19*** 3.43*
Sharpe Ratio 20 -0.0218 93 0.0104 -1.28 -1.11
Treynor Index 20 -0.0011 93 -0.0048 0.31 -0.8
Domestic Equity Beta 6 0.8148 78 0.8871 -0.78 -1.77*
Idiosyncratic Risk 6 0.0028 78 0.0006 1.83* 1.91*
Jensen’s alpha 6 0.0117 78 0.0140 -0.83 -1.11
Appraisal Ratio 6 0.2668 78 0.0413 2.79*** 2.36***
Sharpe Ratio 6 0.1492 78 0.1137 1.14 0.57**
Treynor Index 6 0.0085 78 0.0076 0.31 0.28
European Equity Beta 30 0.8620 127 0.9506 -1.83* -2.34**
Idiosyncratic Risk 30 0.0038 127 0.0013 3.51*** 2.53**
Jensen’s alpha 30 0.0251 127 0.0208 2.56** 2.76***
Appraisal Ratio 30 0.1341 127 0.0532 2.62*** 1.92***
Sharpe Ratio 30 0.0413 127 0.0054 1.71* 0.7**
Treynor Index 30 0.0038 127 0.0024 0.39 0.71
Fixed Income Beta 34 -0.4950 348 -0.2567 -0.57 -1.15
Idiosyncratic Risk 34 -0.0002 348 0.0007 -3.19*** -4.89***
Jensen’s alpha 34 0.0031 348 0.0056 -2.36** -4.1***
Appraisal Ratio 34 0.2882 348 0.2602 0.32 0.19
Sharpe Ratio 34 1.7206 348 0.8769 5.01*** 3.93**
Treynor Index 34 0.0029 348 0.0052 -0.47 -2.06
Foreign Equity Beta 49 0.8944 211 0.8849 0.22 0.45
Idiosyncratic Risk 49 0.0014 211 0.0005 1.26 1.15
Jensen’s alpha 49 0.0236 211 0.0278 -2.1** -1.74*
Appraisal Ratio 49 0.0456 211 0.0189 1.09 1.23
Sharpe Ratio 49 -0.0414 211 -0.0475 0.37 0.33
Treynor Index 49 -0.0023 211 -0.0029 0.48 0.58
Money Market Beta 51 -0.0320 159 0.0089 -0.26 1.37
Idiosyncratic Risk 51 0.0002 159 0.0002 -0.09 -3.23***
Jensen’s alpha 51 0.0011 159 0.0009 0.4 -1.19
Appraisal Ratio 51 0.5036 159 0.5305 -0.33 -1.26*
Sharpe Ratio 51 2.2178 159 2.1264 0.97 0.88
Treynor Index 51 -0.0090 159 0.0034 -1.76* -0.53
Global Beta 17 0.3656 165 0.3359 0.4 0.14
Idiosyncratic Risk 17 0.0016 165 0.0002 1.74* 2.33**
Jensen’s alpha 17 0.0122 165 0.0172 -1.46 -1.56
Continued on next page30
Table 8 – Continued from previous page
Category measure non-users heavy users ttest Wilcoxon
N mean N mean t-stat z-stat
Appraisal Ratio 17 0.1578 165 0.0524 2.64*** 2.53***
Sharpe Ratio 17 0.0509 165 0.0163 0.92 0.23***
Treynor Index 17 -0.0002 165 0.0719 -0.43 -0.72
The table presents the results for di erent risk and performance measures per fund category and group: heavy users and nonusers of
derivatives. Funds are deﬁned as heavy users if their frequency of derivative use is larger than the 75 percentile and their average ratio
of notional value in derivatives to net asset value is larger than the 75 percentile. A t-test and a Wilcoxon test are performed on the
mean and median group values, respectively.The measures are the appraisal ratio, the beta of a market model, the Jensen’s alpha form
a market model, the idiosyncratic risk measured by the root mean squared error of the market model, the Sharpe ratio, and the Treynor
index. Computations are based on monthly returns and the management fee and the deposit fees are added back. The sample covers
the period from March 1995 to March 2005 and funds with more than three years of monthly observations. Fund data is obtained from
the Spanish Security and Exchange Commission, CNMV. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
In all our exercises so far we compared the mean and the median of some per-
formance measures, irrespectively of whether or not each one of the measures is
signiﬁcant at the individual fund level. This makes us wonder if we are missing su-
perior performance of users at the individual fund level which is not reﬂected in the
aggregates. One way of looking into this issue is to compute the fraction of funds that
exhibit signiﬁcant positive or negative performance. As an illustration we look at the
Jensen’s alpha in the market model. In Table 9, panel A, we report the fraction of
funds in each category for which the parameter is signiﬁcantly positive and negative
in the case of returns after fees. The results are quite devastating for funds using
derivatives. As we can appreciate in almost all categories users exhibit a smaller frac-
tion of signiﬁcantly positive coe cients and a larger fraction of signiﬁcantly negative
coe cients compared to non users of derivatives. The results in panel B put the
previous result into perspective. Once fees are added back, results are not any more
that devastating for derivative users. In this case the proportion of positive and sig-
niﬁcant coe cients outweighs the negative and signiﬁcant coe cients, for both users
and heavy users. The results reported in this table highlight again the important role
of fees in the bad performance of users. Fees however fail to explain everything as in
all categories (except Fixed Income and Money Market) non users still show better
statistics.31
Table 9: Percentages of Signiﬁcative Jensen’s alpha Measures.
Panel A
After Fee Returns non-user user heavy user
Category positive negative positive negative positive negative
Balanced Domestic 5.7% 57.1% 1.4% 57.4% 0.0% 68%
Balanced International 0.0% 5.0% 0.0% 24.7% 0.0% 24%
Domestic Equity 33.3% 0.0% 3.8% 39.7% 0.0% 33%
European Equity 26.7% 10.0% 4.7% 18.1% 3.6% 7%
Fixed Income 2.9% 38.2% 3.4% 21.6% 2.8% 15%
Foreign Equity 6.1% 8.2% 5.7% 19.0% 6.1% 18%
Money Market 0.0% 70.6% 1.3% 78.0% 0.0% 78%
Global 5.9% 17.6% 4.2% 12.7% 3.7% 7%
Panel B
Before-Fee Returns non-user user heavy user
Category positive negative positive negative positive negative
Balanced Domestic 17.1% 25.7% 13.1% 12.8% 14.0% 10%
Balanced International 35.0% 0.0% 14.0% 3.2% 11.8% 0%
Domestic Equity 50.0% 0.0% 5.1% 3.8% 6.7% 7%
European Equity 33.3% 0.0% 9.4% 2.4% 17.9% 0%
Fixed Income 20.6% 5.9% 21.6% 1.7% 18.3% 1%
Foreign Equity 10.2% 6.1% 10.0% 6.2% 10.2% 12%
Money Market 43.1% 0.0% 51.6% 0.0% 50.0% 0%
Global 29.4% 0.0% 17.6% 4.8% 7.4% 7%
The table presents the percentages of positive or negative and signiﬁcant Jensen’s alpha coe cients within each category and group.
Groups of funds are non-users, users, and heavy users of derivatives. Heavy users are selected if their frequency of derivative use is
larger than the 75 percentile and their average ratio of notional value in derivatives to net asset value is larger than the 75 percentile.
A coe cient is considered to be signiﬁcant if it is signiﬁcant at the 10% conﬁdence level. Panel A reports after fee results, while panel
B reports before fee results. The sample covers the period from March 1995 to March 2005. Fund data is obtained from the Spanish
Security and Exchange Commission, CNMV. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
5.2 Selectivity and Timing Skills
As stated in the introduction, funds may use derivatives to time the market. The
previous analysis do not explicitly test for timing skills. To complete our performance
evaluation analysis we explicitly test for the existence of superior timing skill among
users of derivatives in the context of the Treynor-Mazuy (1966) model, which is the
most widely used model for this purpose. This model extends the market model by
incorporating a factor that captures market increases. This factor is deﬁned as the
square of the market excess return. The model takes the form:
ri,t   rf,t =  i +  i   (rm,t   rf,t) +  timing,i   (rm,t   rf,t)
2 +  i,t (3)
where ri,t is the fund’s return, rf,t is the risk free rate, and rm,t is the market’s return.
This model allows for the separation of timing and selectivity skills in fund man-32
agement. The ability to select stocks is associated to a positive alpha while timing
skills correspond to a positive market timing coe cient  timing,i. The previous liter-
ature typically reports negative values for the  timing coe cient (Ferson and Shadt
(1996) Cumby and Glenn (1990), among others) and denotes the result as a ”per-
verse” outcome. Regarding the alpha coe cient, it is well recognized by now that if
there is market timing in a fund, then the alpha is biased downwards.
In Tables 10 to 13 we report the results of the estimation of the model. Table 10
and Table 11 correspond to the case of after fees returns for users and heavy users,
respectively; Table 12 and Table 13 correspond to the case of before fees returns for
users and heavy users, respectively.
Regarding timing skills, in almost all the cases we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant di erences
between users and non users of derivatives. The exceptions are the Balance Domes-
tic and the European Equity categories where the timing coe cient is signiﬁcantly
superior in all cases (before and after fees and for users and heavy users). Notice
that the coe cient for the market timing of European Equity funds is even positive.
Regarding the alpha or selectivity parameter, we only ﬁnd superior selectivity skills
in the Fixed Income category (in all cases). In the rest of categories the selectivity
skills of users is worst or not signiﬁcantly di erent to the one of non users.
To conclude, our performance evaluation study results in a very negative picture of
derivatives usage in the Spanish Mutual fund industry. We only ﬁnd a fund category,
Fixed income, that exhibits some (weak) signs of superior performance. We identify
high fees as one variable that partially explain the poor performance of users. We do
not ﬁnd evidence on heavy users being better derivative traders that users.
6 Derivatives Usage and Return Distributions
The mean variance setting is restrictive as it summarizes risk in a single parameter,
the volatility of the return. Investors may have a clear preference for other moments33
Table 10: Selectivity and Timing Skills Of Users.
non-users users
Category Measure N mean N mean ttest t-stat Wilcoxon z-stat
Balanced Domestic mkt timing 35 -0.5072 282 -0.1692 -4.44*** -3.39***
selectivity 35 -0.0004 282 -0.0012 2.77*** 2.63***
Balanced International mkt timing 20 -0.2009 93 -0.1293 -0.47 -0.59
selectivity 20 0.0008 93 -0.0003 2.63*** 2.74***
Domestic Equity mkt timing 6 -0.1698 78 -0.2877 0.54 0.26
selectivity 6 0.0019 78 -0.0001 1.38 2.33**
European Equity mkt timing 30 -0.4447 127 0.0070 -2** -1.94*
selectivity 30 0.0034 127 -0.0003 4.42*** 3.15***
Fixed Income mkt timing 34 -241.4907 348 -146.1361 -0.36 -1.19
selectivity 34 -0.0012 348 -0.0006 -1.11 -2.3**
Foreign Equity mkt timing 49 -0.5803 211 -0.4209 -0.75 -0.65
selectivity 49 0.0016 211 0.0003 1.42 1.32
Money Market mkt timing 51 -4.1428 159 -1.0561 -0.03 -0.47
selectivity 51 -0.0005 159 -0.0002 -0.62 -0.41
Global mkt timing 17 -0.4269 165 -0.3525 -0.27 -0.62
selectivity 17 0.0014 165 0.0000 1.74* 1.66*
The table presents the results for the selectivity and the market timing coe cients, per fund category and group, in the
context of the Treynor-Mazuy (1966) model. Groups are users and nonusers of derivatives. A t-test and a Wilcoxon
test are performed on the mean group values respectively. Returns are computed on a monthly basis. The sample
covers the period March 1995 to March 2005 and funds with more than three years of monthly observations. Fund
data is obtained from the Spanish Security and Exchange Commission, CNMV. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at
5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
of the distribution. For instance, other things equal, investors may have a preference
for small shortfall risk. For this reason it is interesting to look at other moments of
the distribution to see if funds o er return characteristics of interests for investors.
Analyzing the return distributions is also of interest as it may shed light on the reasons
behind derivatives usage. As discussed in the introduction, we should expect some
di erences in return distributions when derivatives are used for speculation versus
risk management/hedging.
In this section we analyze the impact of derivative use on the distribution of
returns. We compute the four central moments and the 10% tails of the distribution
of the monthly returns for each fund for the whole time period and compare the34
Table 11: Selectivity and Timing Skills of Heavy Users.
non-users heavy users
Category Measure N mean N mean ttest t-stat Wilcoxon z-stat
Balanced Domestic mkt timing 35 -0.5072 50 -0.2358 -2.35** -2.11**
selectivity 35 -0.0004 50 -0.0011 1.59 2.02**
Balanced International mkt timing 20 -0.2009 17 -0.2559 0.25 0.24
selectivity 20 0.0008 17 -0.0003 1.86* 1.8*
Domestic Equity mkt timing 6 -0.1698 15 -0.1286 -0.34 -0.16
selectivity 6 0.0019 15 -0.0008 2.82** 2.41**
European Equity mkt timing 30 -0.4447 28 0.1277 -2.17** -1.85*
selectivity 30 0.0034 28 0.0007 2.18** 1.52
Fixed Income mkt timing 34 -241.4907 71 -133.9700 -0.39 -0.1
selectivity 34 -0.0012 71 -0.0003 -1.5 -2.35**
Foreign Equity mkt timing 49 -0.5803 49 -0.3716 -0.86 -0.44
selectivity 49 0.0016 49 0.0003 1.08 0.52
Money Market mkt timing 51 -4.1428 40 58.2579 -1.29 -0.1
selectivity 51 -0.0005 40 0.0000 -0.98 -0.2
Global mkt timing 17 -0.4269 27 -0.5620 0.34 -0.28
selectivity 17 0.0014 27 -0.0005 1.79* 1.1
The table presents the results for the selectivity and the market timing coe cients, per fund category and group, in the context of the
Treynor-Mazuy (1966) model. Groups are heavy users and non users of derivatives. Funds are deﬁned as heavy users if their frequency
of derivative use is larger than the 75 percentile and their average ratio of notional value in derivatives to net asset value is larger
than the 75 percentile. A t-test and a Wilcoxon test are performed on the mean group values respectively. Returns are computed on a
monthly basis. The sample covers the period March 1995 to March 2005 and funds with more than three years of monthly observations.
Fund data is obtained from the Spanish Security and Exchange Commission, CNMV. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; ***
signiﬁcant at 1%.
results for users versus non users of derivatives.18 Before reporting the results it is
convenient to brieﬂy discuss the results we should expect under particular hypothesis.
The ideal scenario of e cient use of derivatives would be one in which the return
of users exhibit larger mean, lower volatility, larger skewness and a larger breakpoint
for both the lower and upper 10% tail of the distribution. In our discussion below we
will refer to superperformers to users in some category that exhibit robust evidence
in at least four of the previous ﬁve conditions. On the other hand, if derivatives
were successfully used for speculation we should expect the distribution of returns to
exhibit either larger mean or larger skewness, and a larger breakpoint for the upper
10% tail. When one of the ﬁrst two conditions are met and the latter condition too
18It is important to remember that in order to have better estimates of the distribution of returns
in the ﬁltering of our data set we excluded all funds with less than three years of observations.35
Table 12: Selectivity and Timing Skills Before Fees Of Users.
non-users users
Category Measure N mean N mean ttest t-stat Wilcoxon z-stat
Balanced Domestic mkt timing 35 -0.4935 282 -0.1701 -4.26*** -3.29***
selectivity 35 0.0007 282 0.0002 1.84* 1.41
Balanced International mkt timing 20 -0.2043 93 -0.1286 -0.49 -0.67
selectivity 20 0.0022 93 0.0010 2.85*** 2.93***
Domestic Equity mkt timing 6 -0.1686 78 -0.2882 0.55 0.28
selectivity 6 0.0033 78 0.0015 1.26 2.08**
European Equity mkt timing 30 -0.4441 127 0.0047 -1.99** -1.93*
selectivity 30 0.0049 127 0.0013 4.26*** 3.05***
Fixed Income mkt timing 34 -262.1762 348 -144.4942 -0.44 -1.34
selectivity 34 -0.0005 348 0.0005 -1.85* -3.15***
Foreign Equity mkt timing 49 -0.5806 211 -0.4229 -0.74 -0.65
selectivity 49 0.0032 211 0.0018 1.43 1.35
Money Market mkt timing 51 3.5188 159 1.8403 0.02 -0.38
selectivity 51 0.0004 159 0.0007 -0.65 -1.12
Global mkt timing 17 -0.4326 165 -0.3559 -0.27 -0.61
selectivity 17 0.0027 165 0.0011 1.84* 1.62
The table presents the results for the selectivity and the market timing coe cients, per fund category and group, in the context of the
Treynor-Mazuy (1966) model. Groups are users and nonusers of derivatives. A t-test and a Wilcoxon test are performed on the mean
group values respectively. Computations are based on monthly returns and the management fee and the deposit fees are added back.
The sample covers the period March 1995 to March 2005 and funds with more than three years of monthly observations. Fund data
is obtained from the Spanish Security and Exchange Commission, CNMV. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at
1%.
we will refer to this situation as a case of successful speculation. When the opposite
conditions are met, that is if the distributions of returns exhibit a larger standard
deviation, or a smaller breakpoint for the lower 10% tail and a larger breakpoint for
the upper 10% tail, and no positive e ect on mean or skewness is reported we will
refer to this situation as a case of unsuccessful speculation. Finally, if derivatives were
used for risk management/hedging purposes we should expect a lower volatility, lower
kurtosis and a larger breakpoint for the lower 10% tail. When these three conditions
are met in some fund category we will refer to this situation as a case of hedging.
As in the analysis in the previous section, funds are grouped in their respective
categories. Within each category we separate funds that use derivatives using both
the deﬁnition of users and heavy users. The analysis cover both the case of returns
before and after fees. The mean of each measure is computed for each group and36
Table 13: Selectivity and Timing Skills Before Fees Of Heavy Users.
non-users heavy users
Category Measure N mean N mean ttest t-stat Wilcoxon z-stat
Balanced Domestic mkt timing 35 -0.4935 50 -0.2369 -2.25** -2.01**
selectivity 35 0.0007 50 0.0004 0.84 0.86
Balanced International mkt timing 20 -0.2043 17 -0.2589 0.25 0.24
selectivity 20 0.0022 17 0.0009 2.31** 2.1**
Domestic Equity mkt timing 6 -0.1686 15 -0.1277 -0.34 -0.16
selectivity 6 0.0033 15 0.0006 2.78** 2.49**
European Equity mkt timing 30 -0.4441 28 0.1265 -2.16** -1.81*
selectivity 30 0.0049 28 0.0021 2.2** 1.57
Fixed Income mkt timing 34 -262.1762 71 -149.3526 -0.41 -0.16
selectivity 34 -0.0005 71 0.0008 -2.1** -3.02***
Foreign Equity mkt timing 49 -0.5806 49 -0.3765 -0.84 -0.39
selectivity 49 0.0032 49 0.0018 1.18 0.65
Money Market mkt timing 51 3.5188 40 63.2440 -1.27 -0.62
selectivity 51 0.0004 40 0.0009 -1.28 -1.61
Global mkt timing 17 -0.4326 27 -0.5665 0.34 -0.25
selectivity 17 0.0027 27 0.0006 1.8* 1.29
The table presents the results for the selectivity and the market timing coe cients, per fund category and group, in the context of the
Treynor-Mazuy (1966) model. Groups are heavy users and nonusers of derivatives. Funds are deﬁned as heavy users if their frequency
of derivative use is larger than the 75 percentile and their average ratio of notional value in derivatives to net asset value is larger
than the 75 percentile. A t-test and a Wilcoxon test are performed on the mean group values respectively. Computations are based
on monthly returns and the management fee and the deposit fees are added back. The sample covers the period March 1995 to March
2005 and funds with more than three years of monthly observations. Fund data is obtained from the Spanish Security and Exchange
Commission, CNMV. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
fund category. Finally, we compare the mean values for each group and measure and
compute the t-statistic for the di erence in group means and the Wilcoxon test on
the group medians. The results are reported in tables 14, 15, 16,and 17.
The ﬁrst observation is that we ﬁnd three categories (Global, Money Market and
Foreign Equity) in which returns are not signiﬁcantly di erent for users versus non
users. This result is robust to almost all speciﬁcations: returns before and after fees,
and users as well as heavy users. The second observation is that we do not ﬁnd a
single category in which users of derivatives can be classiﬁed as superperformers. If
we relax the deﬁnition of superperfromance, asking for just three rather than four of
the ﬁve conditions in the deﬁnition, we ﬁnd some positive evidence in two categories.
In particular, we ﬁnd that user, but not heavy users, in the Balance Domestic and37
Balance International categories can be classiﬁed as superprformers. The third result
is that we do not ﬁnd a single category in which users can be cataloged as hedgers.
That is, from the analysis of the distribution of returns no fund category reports
evidence of using derivatives for hedging or risk management purposes, according to
our deﬁnition. Regarding the use of derivatives for speculation purposes, we ﬁnd two
categories (Domestic Equity and European Equity ) in which users can be classiﬁed
as unsuccessful speculators, and just one category (Fixed Income) in which users can
be classiﬁed as successful speculators.
Table 14: Return Distributions of Users.
Category measure non-users users ttest Wilcoxon
N mean N mean t-stat z-stat
11% 89%
Balanced Domestic mean 35 0.0020 282 0.0030 -2.16** -2.32**
sd 35 0.0238 282 0.0217 0.94 1.05
skewness 35 -0.4585 282 -0.2328 -2.5** -2.5**
kurtosis 35 4.1995 282 4.3622 -0.45 -0.16
10th centile 35 -0.0282 282 -0.0233 -1.75* -1.83*
90th centile 35 0.0304 282 0.0281 0.81 0.69
18% 82%
Balanced International mean 20 0.0005 93 0.0015 -1.73* -2.05**
sd 20 0.0230 93 0.0202 0.97 1.41
skewness 20 -0.6463 93 -0.2760 -2.08** -2.63***
kurtosis 20 3.5229 93 4.5076 -1.49 -2.22**
10th centile 20 -0.0305 93 -0.0234 -1.76* -2.17**
90th centile 20 0.0267 93 0.0239 0.82 1.43
7% 93%
Domestic Equity mean 6 0.0078 78 0.0073 0.37 0.28
sd 6 0.0467 78 0.0546 -1.61 -2.52**
skewness 6 -0.3791 78 -0.2664 -0.93 -0.76
kurtosis 6 3.6254 78 3.5964 0.11 0.14
10th centile 6 -0.0529 78 -0.0593 0.94 1.49
90th centile 6 0.0651 78 0.0779 -1.65 -2.15**
19% 81%
European Equity mean 30 0.0027 127 0.0011 1.55 0.77
sd 30 0.0520 127 0.0536 -0.69 -0.95
skewness 30 -0.5563 127 -0.5257 -0.41 -0.48
kurtosis 30 3.8500 127 3.8238 0.12 1.15
10th centile 30 -0.0668 127 -0.0701 0.75 0.52
90th centile 30 0.0611 127 0.0631 -0.67 -1.07
9% 91%
Fixed Income mean 34 0.0022 348 0.0031 -3.44*** -5.02***
sd 34 0.0035 348 0.0061 -2.51** -4.39***
Continued on next page38
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Category measure non-users users ttest Wilcoxon
N mean N mean t-stat z-stat
skewness 34 0.1273 348 0.2398 -0.63 0.83
kurtosis 34 4.8619 348 4.9742 -0.12 -3.35***
10th centile 34 -0.0018 348 -0.0041 1.69* 3.6***
90th centile 34 0.0060 348 0.0100 -3.65*** -4.67***
19% 81%
Foreign Equity mean 49 -0.0013 211 -0.0022 0.83 0.41
sd 49 0.0559 211 0.0572 -0.51 -0.09
skewness 49 -0.4410 211 -0.3842 -0.87 -0.61
kurtosis 49 3.4423 211 3.5880 -0.97 0.18
10th centile 49 -0.0745 211 -0.0780 0.8 0.71
90th centile 49 0.0634 211 0.0643 -0.29 -0.11
24% 76%
Money Market mean 51 0.0029 159 0.0028 0.76 0.58
sd 51 0.0021 159 0.0019 0.3 -0.26
skewness 51 0.9277 159 0.7348 1.04 -0.16
kurtosis 51 4.5274 159 4.8075 -0.24 -0.48
10th centile 51 0.0011 159 0.0008 0.96 0.88
90th centile 51 0.0053 159 0.0057 -0.82 -0.5
9% 91%
Global mean 17 0.0010 165 0.0012 -0.16 -0.81
sd 17 0.0232 165 0.0253 -0.46 -0.44
skewness 17 -0.6062 165 -0.2614 -1.49 -1.48
kurtosis 17 6.8704 165 5.5960 1.32 -0.1
10th centile 17 -0.0304 165 -0.0297 -0.12 0.41
90th centile 17 0.0266 165 0.0286 -0.41 -0.56
This table presents the four main central moments, the 10th and 90th percentiles of the funds’ distribution of returns per category and
group. Groups are nonusers and users of derivatives. A t-test and a Wilcoxon test are performed on the mean and median group values
per category respectively. At the top of each fund category the percentages of users and non users of derivatives is shown. The central
moments’ measures are the returns’ mean, the returns’ standard deviation, the returns’ skewness, and the returns’ kurtosis. Returns
are computed on a monthly basis. The sample covers the period from March 1995 to March 2005 and funds with more than three years
of monthly observations. Fund data is obtained from the Spanish Security and Exchange Commission, CNMV. * signiﬁcant at 10%; **
signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
Table 15: Return Distributions of Heavy Users.
Category measure non-users heavy users ttest Wilcoxon
N mean N mean t-stat z-stat
Balanced Domestic mean 35 0.0020 50 0.0028 -1.15 -1.51
sd 35 0.0238 50 0.0225 0.49 0.63
skewness 35 -0.4585 50 -0.2529 -2.06** -2.14**
kurtosis 35 4.1995 50 3.9530 0.75 1.47
10th centile 35 -0.0282 50 -0.0244 -1.09 -1.22
90th centile 35 0.0304 50 0.0296 0.2 0.09
Balanced International mean 20 0.0005 17 0.0009 -0.63 -0.64
sd 20 0.0230 17 0.0205 0.64 1.49
skewness 20 -0.6463 17 -0.5661 -0.64 -0.15
kurtosis 20 3.5229 17 4.1375 -2.22** -1.83*
10th centile 20 -0.0305 17 -0.0249 -1 -1.68*
90th centile 20 0.0267 17 0.0246 0.47 1.25
Continued on next page39
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Category measure non-users heavy users ttest Wilcoxon
N mean N mean t-stat z-stat
Domestic Equity mean 6 0.0078 15 0.0065 0.75 0.7
sd 6 0.0467 15 0.0613 -5.13*** -3.43***
skewness 6 -0.3791 15 -0.2726 -1.09 -0.7
kurtosis 6 3.6254 15 3.4088 1.42 0.7
10th centile 6 -0.0529 15 -0.0688 2.81** 2.26**
90th centile 6 0.0651 15 0.0882 -4.05*** -3.04***
European Equity mean 30 0.0027 28 0.0006 1.34 0.98
sd 30 0.0520 28 0.0563 -1.65 -2.18**
skewness 30 -0.5563 28 -0.6527 0.99 0.78
kurtosis 30 3.8500 28 3.8697 -0.07 0.75
10th centile 30 -0.0668 28 -0.0760 1.72* 1.71*
90th centile 30 0.0611 28 0.0665 -1.35 -1.74*
Fixed Income mean 34 0.0022 71 0.0032 -2.77*** -4.66***
sd 34 0.0035 71 0.0080 -3.58*** -5.13***
skewness 34 0.1273 71 0.1782 -0.24 1.61
kurtosis 34 4.8619 71 4.5212 0.3 -2.39**
10th centile 34 -0.0018 71 -0.0064 2.76*** 4.97***
90th centile 34 0.0060 71 0.0122 -4.9*** -5.31***
Foreign Equity mean 49 -0.0013 49 -0.0038 2.04** 2.11**
sd 49 0.0559 49 0.0586 -0.86 -0.07
skewness 49 -0.4410 49 -0.3363 -1.48 -1.28
kurtosis 49 3.4423 49 3.1245 2.75*** 2.82***
10th centile 49 -0.0745 49 -0.0826 1.68* 1.65*
90th centile 49 0.0634 49 0.0663 -0.74 -0.47
Money Market mean 51 0.0029 40 0.0029 -0.06 -0.61
sd 51 0.0021 40 0.0018 0.74 -1.08
skewness 51 0.9277 40 0.9271 0 -0.62
kurtosis 51 4.5274 40 4.1767 0.29 -0.04
10th centile 51 0.0011 40 0.0010 0.79 0.2
90th centile 51 0.0053 40 0.0056 -1.05 -1.58
Global mean 17 0.0010 27 0.0002 0.46 -0.23
sd 17 0.0232 27 0.0276 -0.64 -0.47
skewness 17 -0.6062 27 -0.5532 -0.16 -0.47
kurtosis 17 6.8704 27 5.3956 0.93 0.59
10th centile 17 -0.0304 27 -0.0306 0.01 0.49
90th centile 17 0.0266 27 0.0282 -0.27 -0.42
This table presents the four main central moments, the 10th and 90th percentiles of the funds’ distribution of returns per category and
group. Groups are non users and heavy users of derivatives. Funds are deﬁned as heavy users if their frequency of derivative use is larger
than the 75 percentile and their average ratio of notional value in derivatives to net asset value is larger than the 75 percentile. A t-test
and a Wilcoxon test are performed on the mean and median group values per category respectively. The central moments’ measures
are the returns’ mean, the returns’ standard deviation, the returns’ skewness, and the returns’ kurtosis. Returns are computed on a
monthly basis and the management fee and the deposit fees are added back.. The sample covers the period from March 1995 to March
2005 and funds with more than three years of monthly observations. Fund data is obtained from the Spanish Security and Exchange
Commission, CNMV. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
Table 16: Before Fees Return Distributions of Users.
Category measure non-users users ttest Wilcoxon
N mean N mean t-stat z-stat
Balanced Domestic mean 35 0.0031 282 0.0044 -2.63*** -2.76***
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Category measure non-users users ttest Wilcoxon
N mean N mean t-stat z-stat
sd 35 0.0238 282 0.0217 0.92 1.03
skewness 35 -0.4485 282 -0.2314 -2.38** -2.41**
kurtosis 35 4.2059 282 4.3650 -0.43 -0.12
10th centile 35 -0.0270 282 -0.0219 -1.83* -1.95*
90th centile 35 0.0315 282 0.0295 0.71 0.59
Balanced International mean 20 0.0019 93 0.0028 -1.62 -1.85*
sd 20 0.0230 93 0.0202 0.97 1.4
skewness 20 -0.6490 93 -0.2774 -2.09** -2.63***
kurtosis 20 3.5270 93 4.5119 -1.48 -2.26**
10th centile 20 -0.0292 93 -0.0221 -1.77* -2.2**
90th centile 20 0.0281 93 0.0252 0.82 1.46
Domestic Equity mean 6 0.0092 78 0.0089 0.21 0.19
sd 6 0.0467 78 0.0547 -1.62 -2.52**
skewness 6 -0.3793 78 -0.2657 -0.92 -0.76
kurtosis 6 3.6238 78 3.5981 0.09 0.14
10th centile 6 -0.0514 78 -0.0577 0.92 1.48
90th centile 6 0.0664 78 0.0796 -1.69* -2.21**
European Equity mean 30 0.0041 127 0.0027 1.4 0.69
sd 30 0.0520 127 0.0536 -0.7 -0.96
skewness 30 -0.5571 127 -0.5254 -0.42 -0.49
kurtosis 30 3.8517 127 3.8236 0.13 1.15
10th centile 30 -0.0654 127 -0.0686 0.73 0.52
90th centile 30 0.0626 127 0.0648 -0.73 -1.14
Fixed Income mean 34 0.0030 348 0.0041 -4.38*** -5.39***
sd 34 0.0035 348 0.0061 -2.5** -4.36***
skewness 34 0.1150 348 0.2447 -0.73 0.71
kurtosis 34 4.8271 348 4.9765 -0.16 -3.51***
10th centile 34 -0.0010 348 -0.0030 1.48 3.08***
90th centile 34 0.0068 348 0.0111 -3.84*** -4.68***
Foreign Equity mean 49 0.0002 211 -0.0006 0.83 0.5
sd 49 0.0559 211 0.0573 -0.51 -0.09
skewness 49 -0.4409 211 -0.3844 -0.86 -0.61
kurtosis 49 3.4431 211 3.5884 -0.96 0.19
10th centile 49 -0.0729 211 -0.0765 0.81 0.71
90th centile 49 0.0650 211 0.0659 -0.28 -0.08
Money Market mean 51 0.0038 159 0.0038 0.39 -0.66
sd 51 0.0021 159 0.0020 0.29 -0.25
skewness 51 0.9158 159 0.7330 1.02 -0.13
kurtosis 51 4.3968 159 4.6830 -0.26 -0.53
10th centile 51 0.0019 159 0.0017 0.87 -0.53
90th centile 51 0.0063 159 0.0067 -0.87 -0.49
Global mean 17 0.0022 165 0.0023 -0.06 -0.78
sd 17 0.0232 165 0.0253 -0.45 -0.42
skewness 17 -0.5982 165 -0.2578 -1.47 -1.51
kurtosis 17 6.7723 165 5.5984 1.22 -0.14
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Category measure non-users users ttest Wilcoxon
N mean N mean t-stat z-stat
10th centile 17 -0.0292 165 -0.0286 -0.1 0.41
90th centile 17 0.0279 165 0.0297 -0.37 -0.51
This table presents the four main central moments, the 10th and 90th percentiles of the funds’ distribution of the before fee returns
per category and group. Groups are non users and users of derivatives. A t-test and a Wilcoxon test are performed on the mean and
median group values per category respectively. The central moments’ measures are the returns’ mean, the returns’ standard deviation,
the returns’ skewness, and the returns’ kurtosis. Returns are computed on a monthly basis and the management fee and the deposit
fees are added back. The sample covers the period from March 1995 to March 2005 and funds with more than three years of monthly
observations. Fund data is obtained from the Spanish Security and Exchange Commission, CNMV. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant
at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
Table 17: Before Fees Return Distributions of Heavy Users.
Category measure non-users users ttest Wilcoxon
N mean N mean t-stat z-stat
Balanced Domestic mean 35 0.0031 50 0.0042 -1.47 -1.87*
sd 35 0.0238 50 0.0225 0.47 0.62
skewness 35 -0.4485 50 -0.2544 -1.94* -2.04**
kurtosis 35 4.2059 50 3.9521 0.77 1.53
10th centile 35 -0.0270 50 -0.0230 -1.16 -1.32
90th centile 35 0.0315 50 0.0310 0.13 0.09
Balanced International mean 20 0.0019 17 0.0021 -0.34 -0.24
sd 20 0.0230 17 0.0205 0.64 1.49
skewness 20 -0.6490 17 -0.5674 -0.65 -0.15
kurtosis 20 3.5270 17 4.1352 -2.2** -1.83*
10th centile 20 -0.0292 17 -0.0238 -0.97 -1.65*
90th centile 20 0.0281 17 0.0257 0.5 1.37
Domestic Equity mean 6 0.0092 15 0.0080 0.71 0.7
sd 6 0.0467 15 0.0613 -5.15*** -3.43***
skewness 6 -0.3793 15 -0.2725 -1.09 -0.7
kurtosis 6 3.6238 15 3.4088 1.41 0.7
10th centile 6 -0.0514 15 -0.0674 2.82** 2.18**
90th centile 6 0.0664 15 0.0896 -4.01*** -3.04***
European Equity mean 30 0.0041 28 0.0020 1.35 1.09
sd 30 0.0520 28 0.0563 -1.65 -2.19**
skewness 30 -0.5571 28 -0.6526 0.98 0.78
kurtosis 30 3.8517 28 3.8666 -0.05 0.75
10th centile 30 -0.0654 28 -0.0746 1.73* 1.73*
90th centile 30 0.0626 28 0.0680 -1.36 -1.76*
Fixed Income mean 34 0.0030 71 0.0043 -3.52*** -5.03***
sd 34 0.0035 71 0.0080 -3.56*** -5.15***
skewness 34 0.1150 71 0.1840 -0.32 1.49
kurtosis 34 4.8271 71 4.5116 0.28 -2.6***
10th centile 34 -0.0010 71 -0.0053 2.58** 4.62***
90th centile 34 0.0068 71 0.0133 -5.06*** -5.42***
Foreign Equity mean 49 0.0002 49 -0.0024 2.13** 2.31**
sd 49 0.0559 49 0.0586 -0.86 -0.07
skewness 49 -0.4409 49 -0.3373 -1.46 -1.28
kurtosis 49 3.4431 49 3.1253 2.75*** 2.84***
10th centile 49 -0.0729 49 -0.0812 1.7* 1.64*
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Category measure non-users users ttest Wilcoxon
N mean N mean t-stat z-stat
90th centile 49 0.0650 49 0.0677 -0.7 -0.35
Money Market mean 51 0.0038 40 0.0039 -0.49 -1.7*
sd 51 0.0021 40 0.0018 0.77 -0.91
skewness 51 0.9158 40 0.9214 -0.03 -0.67
kurtosis 51 4.3968 40 4.0074 0.36 -0.1
10th centile 51 0.0019 40 0.0020 -0.28 -1.46
90th centile 51 0.0063 40 0.0067 -1.1 -1.36
Global mean 17 0.0022 27 0.0013 0.5 -0.33
sd 17 0.0232 27 0.0276 -0.64 -0.47
skewness 17 -0.5982 27 -0.5561 -0.13 -0.4
kurtosis 17 6.7723 27 5.3952 0.89 0.54
10th centile 17 -0.0292 27 -0.0294 0.03 0.47
90th centile 17 0.0279 27 0.0294 -0.25 -0.35
This table presents the four main central moments, the 10th and 90th percentiles of the funds’ distribution of the before fee returns
per category and group. Groups are non users and heavy users of derivatives. Funds are deﬁned as heavy users if their frequency of
derivative use is larger than the 75 percentile and their average ratio of notional value in derivatives to net asset value is larger than the
75 percentile. A t-test and a Wilcoxon test are performed on the mean and median group values per category respectively. The central
moments’ measures are the returns’ mean, the returns’ standard deviation, the returns’ skewness, and the returns’ kurtosis. Returns
are computed on a monthly basis and the management fee and the deposit fees are added back. The sample covers the period from
March 1995 to March 2005 and funds with more than three years of monthly observations. Fund data is obtained from the Spanish
Security and Exchange Commission, CNMV. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
Our study of the distributions of returns does not improve the overall picture on
derivatives usage. The use of derivatives is related to speculation rather than hedging,
but speculators do not exhibit special talent in any category except in the Fixed
Income segment. This category is the only one that survives both the performance
evaluation and return distributions exercises we perform in this paper.
7 Cash Flow Management vs. Incentive Gaming
Hypothesis
The incentive gaming theory in fund management states that if funds have bad (good)
performance at the beginning of the evaluation period, they have an incentive to in-
crease (decrease) the fund’s risk as the ﬁnal date of the evaluation period approaches.
Hence the theory predicts that the changes in fund risk before the evaluation period
are negatively correlated to the fund’s previous performance. This theory has found
empirical support in Brown et. al. (1996) and Koski and Ponti  (1999). In addition,43
in the fund literature, there is evidence that when funds perform well (bad) there is
a tendency for the fund to receive new cash inﬂows (outﬂows) Ippolito (1992). These
new cash ﬂows, if large enough, can alter the risk proﬁles of the funds if the cash is
not rapidly and e ciently spread out through the investment positions. Large cash
inﬂows may have the e ect of reducing the fund’s risk, while large cash outﬂows may
increase the fund’s risk. Since cash inﬂows tend to increase with the fund’s good past
performance and cash outﬂows with the fund’s bad performance, we have a second
channel that links the fund’s risk with the fund’s past performance. But, if funds are
allowed to used derivatives, these in turn could be used to reduce, even eliminate,
the e ects of cash in- and outﬂows on the fund’s risk proﬁle. This is the cash ﬂow
management hypothesis of Koski and Ponti  (1999).
In order to analyze if the evidence favors the incentive gaming theory or the
cash ﬂow management hypothesis, Koski and Ponti  (1999) propose the following
regression equation:
 Riski,t =  + 1Di+ 2Perfi,t 1+ 3Di Perfi,t 1+ 4 Riski,t 1+ j jdummyj (4)
where  Riski,t is the change in risk form the second to the ﬁrst semester of
the year, Di is a dummy variable which indicates the use of derivatives by fund i,
Perfi,t 1 is the di erence of the fund’s mean return and the average mean return in
the ﬁrst semester for all funds in the same investment category, and Riski,t 1 is the
risk variable in the ﬁrst semester. Finally, dummies are included for each time period,
fund category, fund size, and the interaction of time-period and fund category. The
analyzed risk measures are the six-month standard deviation, the six-month beta and
the six-month idiosyncratic risk in the market model. Koski and Ponti  (1999) do
the simplifying assumption, as in the previous literature, that the fund’s evaluation
date is the natural calendar year end. We follow the same assumption. In order to
capture this in the model only the change in risk from the ﬁrst to the second semester
of each calendar year is considered. A weighted least squares (WLS) regression is44
used, where the weight is one divided by the standard deviation of the fund error of
a ﬁrst pass OLS regression. The WLS regression controls for fund heteroscedasticity.
The coe cient  2 of the Perf variable relates performance and change in risk for
funds that do not use derivatives. In support to the cash ﬂow management hypothesis
and the incentive gaming hypothesis, it is expected to ﬁnd a negative coe cient. The
coe cient  3 gives the marginal e ect of the interaction of derivative use and past
performance on the change in risk. It is expected to ﬁnd a positive  3 coe cient in
support of the cash ﬂow management hypothesis and a negative coe cient in support
of the incentive gaming hypothesis. The reason for including the lagged risk variable
Riski,t 1 in the regression speciﬁcation is to control for measurement errors in the
risk variables, therefore one would expect a reversion of the errors from one period
to the next. The coe cient for this variable is expected to be negative.
Table 18 reports the results for both the OLS and the WLS regressions using three
alternative lagged risk measures (standard deviation, beta and idiosyncratic risk) and
controlling for size, dividend yield, fund categories, sub-period and the interaction of
fund categories and sub-periods.19 As expected in all cases the lagged risk variable
Riski,t 1 has a negative and signiﬁcant coe cient. The performance coe cient  2
is negative for all risk measures and regressions, and signiﬁcant for all lagged risk
measures and regressions except for the OLS regression with the idiosyncratic risk as
the lagged risk measure. The interaction of past performance and derivative use is
positive and signiﬁcant for the standard deviation and beta as lagged risk measures,
and it is negative but not signiﬁcant for the idiosyncratic risk as the lagged risk mea-
sure. That is, the e ect of past performance on change in risk is reduced for derivative
users if risk is measured as the standard deviation or as the market exposure, beta.
Therefore, the evidence is more supportive of the cash ﬂow management hypothesis
than the incentive gaming hypothesis. Observe also that the constant coe cient of
19Three o cial fund types, short term ﬁxed income (RFCP), long term ﬁxed income (RFLP) and
money market (FIAMM), are excluded form the analysis since the estimation of the parameters beta
and root mean squared for six-month periods presented several complications.45
the regression model is positive and signiﬁcant for all lagged risk measures. We inter-
pret this as evidence of a increase over time of the funds risk in the second semester
relative to the ﬁrst semester of the calendar year. Since the reduction in risk due to
the use of derivatives is signiﬁcant for the standard deviation and the beta as lagged
risk measures, it seems that market index derivatives are the most likely instruments
being used for cash ﬂow management.
Table 18: Cash Flow Management vs. Incentive Gaming.
STD ols STD wls IDIO ols IDIO wls BETA ols BETA wls
Constant 0.015 0.202 0.057 0.474 0.202 0.090
(0.029) (0.049)*** (0.020)*** (0.040)*** (0.044)*** (0.078)
D -0.003 -0.006 0.006 0.060 0.006 -0.026
(0.006) (0.012) (0.004) (0.010)*** (0.009) (0.017)
Perf -0.301 -0.590 -0.025 -0.151 -0.238 -0.535
(0.046)*** (0.073)*** (0.034) (0.069)** (0.073)*** (0.109)***
D* Perf 0.321 0.867 -0.035 -0.014 0.142 0.228








Observations 7680 7680 7493 7493 7493 7493
R-squared 0.66 0.63 0.48 0.57 0.36 0.38
The table reports the results for the estimation of the Koski and Ponti  (1999) model where the change in risk is regressed on past
performance (Perf), a dummy variable (D) indicating derivative use, the interaction of past performance and the dummy on derivative
use (Dperf), and the lagged risk measure (Risk). The respective risk measures are the six month standard deviation (STD), the six
month root mean squared error from a market model (IDIO), and the beta of the market model (BETA). The regressions control for log
of assets, dividends, subperiods, for fund category and interactions of sub-period and fund category. Funds with outlying price patterns
are eliminated. The fund types RFCP, RFLP and FIAMM are also eliminated, since their estimation parameter beta is too unstable
for the six months estimation period. The dependent variable is the change in risk from the ﬁrst semester of the calendar year to the
second semester. The sample covers the period from March 1995 to March 2005. Fund data is obtained from the Spanish Security and
Exchange Commission, CNMV. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
8 Final Remarks
This study provides a comprehensive analysis of derivatives usage in the Spanish mu-
tual fund industry. Mutual funds in Spain are heavy users of derivatives. By 2005
more than 60% of the funds were users and held positions in derivatives whose no-
tional represented an average 10% of the funds value. These funds tend to be funds
that belong to a large family where other funds also use derivatives, funds that charge46
large fees, non-load funds, large funds and funds with low dividend yields. In general,
the use of derivatives does not improve the performance of the funds. In only one out
of eight categories (Fixed Income funds) we ﬁnd some (very weak and not robust)
evidence of superior performance. In most of the cases users underperform non users.
Users do not seem to exhibit either superior timing or selectivity skills, but rather
the contrary. The only exceptions are the Balance Domestic and European Equity
categories that exhibit timing skills and Fixed Income that exhibit selectivity skills.
We ﬁnd no strong evidence of derivative use for hedging purposes. The exceptions
are Balanced Domestic and Balanced International funds which we cataloged as su-
perperformers since they attain a larger skewness and a larger mean with a lower risk
(larger breakpoint for the lower 10% tail). We ﬁnd stronger evidence of derivatives
being used either for speculative purposes or to mimic their non user of derivatives
counterparts. In the case of speculation we only ﬁnd evidence of successful specula-
tion in the ﬁxed income category. Finally, we ﬁnd evidence of derivatives being used
to manage the funds’ cash inﬂows and outﬂows more e ciently.
The previous results, specially the ones on performance, conﬁgure a rather nega-
tive picture of derivatives usage in the Spanish mutual fund industry. One possible
explanation is that users of derivatives charge very large fees. In fact, we show that
this is part of the problem as users in some categories improve when we evaluate
them using returns before fees. Another possible explanation is that our study is
missing some important aspects of usage. For instance, for brevity of exposition we
have focused on some of the most widely used performance measures, but we are not
providing evidence on some others of interest. In particular we do not address perfor-
mance in the context of conditional asset pricing models nor in the context of factor
models that control for the value, size and momentum e ects. On the other hand our
study compares the average performance of users and non users of derivatives, which
is equivalent to compare equally weighted portfolios of those funds. Since skillful
derivative traders are expensive, it may be the case that only the largest funds can47
a ord them. If this were the case, our methodology is under-weighting the impor-
tance of these funds. This calls for an analysis of value weighted portfolios of funds.
These two are some of the extensions we plan to address in future research.
A Appendix A
Name and description of the o cial fund categories.
Table 19: Description of O cial Fund Categories.
Name Description
FIAMM Euro denominated ﬁxed income assets, with a max 5% in non euro assets
RFCP Duration less than two years, with a max 5% in non euro assets
RFLP Duration larger than two years, with a max 5% in non euro assets
RFI No equities allowed, with a max 5% in non euro assets
RFM Less than 30% in equities, with a max 5% in non euro assets
RVM Between 30% and 75% in equities, with a max 5% in non euro assets
RFMI Less than 30% in equities, more than 5% in non euro assets
RVMI Between 30% and 75% in equities, and more than 5% in non euro assets
RVN More than 75% in equities traded in Spanish markets, with more than 90% in national assets
RVE More than 75% in equites, and national assets less than 90%, a max of 30% in non euro assets
RVIE RVIJ RVIU RVIM RVIO More than 75% in equities, at least 75% in assets issued by either European, Japan,
USA, or Emerging markets, and Other issuers respectively , and more than 30% in non euro assets
FGL Those funds that do not ﬁt into any of the previous deﬁnitions
This table presents the o cial fund type deﬁnitions. Each fund in Spain is assigned to one of these fund types according to the fund’s
portfolio characteristics.
A Appendix B
In this section we brieﬂy described some of the errors we have found in the fund data
set and the criteria followed in trying to ﬁx them.
• Reported values of notional and market value of derivatives positions. In most
of the cases funds report the same ﬁgure for the notional and the market value
of the position. In some cases they report one of them takes the value zero
and the other a positive value. In a few cases negatives values were found. We
decided to use the absolute value of the reported market value as the notional
of the position.48
• Typing errors for the notional amount and the market value for derivative po-
sitions. In some quarters we observed obvious typing errors. The information
should be reported in thousands, but positions were introduced in units. Cor-
rection: The general procedure to ﬁx this is to take the aggregate sum of the
derivative positions and if they were greater than the total net asset value of
the fund, the position was divided by 1000.
• Prices captured after death of funds: the share asset prices for some funds are
reported after the o cial date of the fund’s deregistration. Correction: A list of
o cial date of deregistration was created for some funds, and any price falling
after this date was eliminated.
• Problems in reporting prices for mergers or acquisitions:If a fund merged with
others, in some cases prices continue to be reported for the merged fund or
acquired fund after the merger date. Moreover, the price series typically show a
clear discontinuity. For the series for which such a discontinuity was detected,
the series is dropped out of the sample.
• Some funds where detected to have strange price patterns, one example is one
fund whose price did not change through a long period of time. Such type of
funds were eliminated.49
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